The Nine Lives of Schroedinger's Cat by Schreiber, Zvi
ar
X
iv
:q
ua
nt
-p
h/
95
01
01
4v
5 
 2
7 
Ja
n 
19
95
University of London
Imperial College of Science, Technology and Medicine
Department of Physics
The Nine Lives of
Schro¨dinger’s Cat
On the interpretation of
non-relativistic quantum mechanics
Zvi Schreiber
Rakach Institute of Physics
The Herbrew University
Givaat Ram
Jerusalem 91904
e-mail zvi1@shum.cc.huji.ac.il
A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment
of the requirements for the degree of
Master of Science of the University of London
October 1994
Contents
I Introduction 1
I.1 Introduction 2
I.1.1 A brief history of quantum mechanics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
I.1.2 The interpretational issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
I.1.3 Outline of thesis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
II Quantum mechanics 7
II.1 Formulation of quantum mechanics 8
II.1.1 Dirac notation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
II.1.2 Systems and observables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
II.1.3 Formulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
II.1.4 The Heisenberg picture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
II.1.5 Quantisation and the Schro¨dinger representation . . . . . . . . . . . 15
II.1.6 Mixed states and the density matrix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
II.1.7 The Logico-algebraic approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
II.1.8 Spin half . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
II.2 Histories 25
III Interpretation 33
III.1 The Orthodox interpretation 34
III.2 Bohr’s interpretation 40
III.3 Mind causes collapse 46
III.4 Hidden variables 53
III.5 Many-worlds interpretation 62
III.6 Many-minds interpretation 69
III.7 Bohm’s interpretation 73
III.8 Decoherent histories (Ontology) 82
III.9 Decoherent histories (Epistemology) 89
IV Conclusion 94
IV.1 Conclusion 95
Part I
Introduction
The most remarkable aspect of quantum mechanics is that it needs
interpretation. Never before has there been a situation in which a
physical theory provides correct predictions for the behaviour of a
system without providing a clear model of the system.
By way of introducing the interpretational issues, Part I briefly
sketches the historical development of the formalism and concepts
of quantum mechanics.
(A detailed history may be found in [Jam89].)
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Chapter I.1
Introduction
I.1.1 A brief history of quantum mechanics
In classical physics, some aspects of nature are described using particles, others using
waves. Light, in particular, was described by waves.
In 1900, Max Planck showed that the spectrum of blackbody radiation, which could
not be explained in terms of waves, could be explained by the assumption that light
is emitted in discrete quanta of energy [Pla90, Pla91]. Later, in 1905, Albert Einstein
showed that the photoelectric effect, which also did not fit the wave model, could be
explained by the assumption that light is always quantised [Ein05]. This controver-
sial suggestion was not accepted until after the famous experiments of Arthur Holly
Compton in 1923 [Com23a, Com23b].
In 1923, Louis de Broglie suggested that, conversely, ‘particles’ might display wave-
like properties [Bro23b, Bro23c, Bro23a, Bro24]. This was later confirmed, most
strikingly by the Davisson-Germer experiment of 1927 [DG27].
In 1925, Werner Heisenberg introduced matrix mechanics [Hei25]. This formalism
was able to predict the energy levels of quantum systems. It was cast in the form
of a wave function and differential equation by Erwin Schro¨dinger in the following
year [Sch26]. The efforts of Paul Dirac [Dir26], Pascual Jordan [Jor27] and others at
synthesising the two approaches (the so called transformation theory) led to the more
general formalism of quantum mechanics [Neu55].
These developments marked a turning point in physics. For the first time, physi-
cal results were being derived, not from a model of the universe, but from abstract
mathematical constructs such as the Schro¨dinger wave function. There was an un-
precedented need for interpretation.
In 1926, Max Born suggested that the values in a particle’s wave function gave the
probabilities of finding the particle in a given place [Bor26]. This really set the cat
amongst the pigeons. The suggestion that the laws of physics were non-deterministic
2
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flew in the face of everything achieved since Newton.
In retrospect, the work of Born precipitated an even more radical revolution: a switch
in physics from ontology (discussion of what is) to epistemology (discussion of what is
known). According to Born, an experiment to determine the position of a quantum
system would give results with probabilities dictated by the wave function. This
statement talks about what results are obtained instead of modelling the process. It
involves an artificial division of the world into system and observer.
The following interpretational questions were raised.
• Accepting quantum mechanics as an epistemological theory, is there a specific place
at which the observer-system cut should be located? In more concrete terms: are
there certain systems which may be described by a wave function and others which
may not?
If there is no such fixed observer-system cut, is it consistent to allow this cut to be
made at different places according to convenience? In other words, may we always
choose how much of a system to describe by a wave function?
• Is there an ontological theory underlying the epistemological formulation of quan-
tum mechanics? In other words, is there a model of the universe from which we
can derive the fact that certain systems may be treated using quantum mechanics?
If such a model is proposed, does it explain the non-determinism of quantum me-
chanics in terms of an underlying deterministic mechanism?
In response to these questions, two main schools of thought arose. Bohr and his
followers (notably Heisenberg) embraced the epistemological viewpoint and argued
that it cannot be possible to find an underlying ontological theory.
Einstein and his followers (notably Schro¨dinger) felt that a deterministic ontological
physics must underly the non-deterministic epistemological predictions of quantum
theory. The states in such underlying theories were dubbed hidden variables.
A critical twist came in 1935 when Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen (EPR) showed that
the formalism of quantum mechanics implied nonlocality: an action at one point may
have immediate consequences at a distant point without any apparent intervening
mechanism [EPR35]. They inferred that quantum mechanics cannot be complete.
There must be an underlying theory which is local.
This highlighted a division amongst those who accepted quantum mechanics as a
fundamental theory.
Bohr himself was a positivist. He insisted on describing things through macroscopic
observations only and rejected the idea that the Schro¨dinger wave function repre-
sented the state of a particle. At best, the wave function was a useful way of predicting
the macroscopic results of an experiment on the particle. As such, it was essentially
physically meaningless to discuss whether the wave function behaved nonlocally.
John von Neumann and Paul Dirac, on the other hand, were perfectly happy to talk
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about the state of a particle. However, rather than accepting EPR’s argument for an
underlying theory, they simply accepted that the world is indeed nonlocal.
Later, in 1964, the controversy was to take another turn when John Bell showed that
it was the predictions of quantum theory and not merely the formalism that implied
nonlocality [Bel64]. Even if an underlying deterministic theory were found, it would
not be local!
In the mean time, there had been two important developments in the interpretation
of quantum mechanics. In 1952, David Bohm proposed a hidden variables theory
[Boh52]. (The core of Bohm’s idea had earlier been proposed by de Broglie [Bro27]
and abandoned [Bro30].) Although it had some strange features including, of course,
nonlocality, this was the first real candidate for a deterministic theory underlying
quantum mechanics.
In 1957, Hugh Everett III proposed a radical interpretation. He suggested that the
Schro¨dinger wave function describes not one world but an infinite and growing col-
lection of realities [Eve57a]. When the position of a particle is measured, rather than
saying it may turn out to be here or there, Everett suggested that it will be both here
and there, in parallel realities.
As well as being bizarre, Everett’s interpretation was rather vague. What constitutes
a measurement for the purposes of causing reality to split?
Considerable progress was made on this question through study of the phenomenon
of decoherence [FV63, Zur81, Zur82, CL83, JZ85, Zur86]. This study abandoned
simplified models of isolated lab equipment and started to consider the effects of the
environment. This led to a number of “post-Everett” interpretations, some building
closely on Everett’s ideas, others not, but all a little more sophisticated and a little
less vague. Histories have emerged as the favourite formalism for this work.
I.1.2 The interpretational issues
Quantum mechanics is formulated in terms of a system and an observer. It describes
the state of the system using the Schro¨dinger equation, or, more abstractly, using a
mathematical construct called Hilbert space. The theory predicts the possible results
for any experiment performed by the observer, as well as the associated probabilities.
The main interpretational issues are as follows.
The measurement problem
The central interpretational issue will emerge in Chapter III.1. It is the fact that
measurement, when modelled within the quantum formalism, gives results different
to those predicted for external measurements, ie. measurements on the system. This
is called the measurement problem.
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The problem is exemplified by Schro¨dinger’s maltreated cat [Sch35], after which this
work is named. Schro¨dinger’s cat is placed in a sealed box with a bomb. The bomb
is triggered by the decay of a particle.
According to quantum mechanics, the particle quickly takes on a state in which it is
in a superposition of being decayed or intact. If the bomb checks the particle after
one minute, at that point the particle will take on a definite state of decayed or intact,
with particular probabilities of each, and the bomb will explode or not as appropriate.
The cat is either alive or die.
This however assumes that the particle is a quantum system and the bomb is an
external observer (alternatively that the cat is an external observer). Now suppose
the entire box is treated as a quantum system while Schro¨dinger1 is the observer. Then
quantum mechanics predicts that the entire cat is in a superposed state of alive and
dead until Schro¨dinger comes along. (In principle, Schro¨dinger could actually check
whether this superposition exists therefore establishing the location of the system-
observer cut, though not in practice.)
This problem means that one cannot move around the observer-system cut at will.
One can also not do away with it and treat the whole universe as a quantum system
because in such a treatment the cat will always be in a superposition of dead and
alive, an absurd result.
In summary, one does not know what constitutes a quantum system and what does
not. One only knows that the whole universe (or any other closed system, ie. system
without an observer) cannot sensibly be treated as a quantum system. One therefore
cannot use quantum mechanics to describe the whole world or to recover classical
physics.
Non-determinism
Quantum mechanics stipulates that the result of an external observation is non-
deterministic. It predicts the probabilities. But is the world truly non-deterministic?
Or does the uncertainty result from our ignorance of some details of the state of the
system and/or apparatus?
Locality
The conventional interpretation of quantum mechanics is nonlocal. Actions at one
point may have consequences at a distant point without any apparent intervening
mechanism. Specifically, actions at one point can cause an observable at a distant
location to take on a definite value.
Is this really what is happening and if so can it be used to communicate instantly
1Apologies for the misinterpretation of “Schro¨dinger’s cat” as the cat belonging to Schro¨dinger as
opposed to the cat experiment conceived by Schro¨dinger.
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with a remote site (signal nonlocality)? Or perhaps the effect is an illusion. Perhaps
the remote observable always had a definite value and it is simply being revealed by
the local action.
I.1.3 Outline of thesis
Part II describes the rules of quantum mechanics and formal aspects of quantum
theory which are relevant to interpretation.
Part III concerns interpretation. Nine interpretations are considered.
In Part IV, a brief stock-taking takes place. Has a favourite interpretation emerged?
Did curiousity kill the cat?
Part II
Quantum mechanics
The orthodox formulation of quantum mechanics is presented as a
series of rules. Some alternative formulations — the Heisenberg
picture, the Schro¨dinger wave function, the density matrix and the
logico-algebraic approach — are also presented. The case of a spin
half particle is briefly described.
Then, in the second chapter, the formalism of histories is developed.
Issues of interpretation are not considered until Part III.
Note that these chapters assume familiarity with the mathematics
of Hilbert space and self-adjoint operators including the spectral
theorem in the projection-valued-measure (p.v.m.) form. The con-
cepts of a boolean lattice (= boolean algebra), algebraic congruence
and Borel set are also used. (A useful text for this type of maths
is [RS80]).
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Chapter II.1
Formulation of quantum
mechanics
II.1.1 Dirac notation
Quantum mechanics makes extensive use of the Hilbert space construction. Usually
the notation introduced by Paul Dirac [Dir47] is used.
In Dirac’s notation every state in Hilbert space is called a ket and written |ψ〉 where
ψ identifies the state (eg. an eigenstate is often identified by its eigenvalues when the
relevant operator is made clear by context).
The inner product of |φ〉 with |ψ〉 is written 〈φ|ψ〉 and called a bracket. This suggests
that 〈φ| should be called a bra (in fact, the bra associated with |φ〉). It may be seen
as a linear map from the Hilbert space to C.
Note that 〈Aˆψ, φ〉 = 〈ψ|Aˆ†|φ〉 so the bra associated with the ket Aˆ|ψ〉 is written
〈ψ|Aˆ†.
For |φ〉∈H1, |ψ〉∈H2, the tensor product |φ〉⊗|ψ〉 is simply written |φ〉|ψ〉. It follows
that |φ〉〈φ| projects onto the subspace spanned by |φ〉.
The notation |φ〉〈ψ| is used for the linear map which takes |χ〉 to |φ〉〈ψ|χ〉, ie. to
(〈ψ|χ〉)|φ〉.
II.1.2 Systems and observables
The following slightly vague definitions of a system and an observable will be used.
Definition II.1.1 A physical system is any subset of the matter in the universe
which does not interact with the other matter except when measured, ie. such inter-
8
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action which occurs is carefully controlled.
It is now necessary to define properties such as position and momentum of a system.
Following Dirac, these are called observables.
Definition II.1.2 A physical observable of a system is a type of measurement
which may be performed on the system.
For example, if the system comprises a particle and this particle is allowed to hit a
photographic plate, the position of the dot on the photographic plate may be called
the position observable.
Note that this definition defines the position of the particle in terms of something
that can be seen, namely the dot on the photographic plate.
However, for now it is assumed that the position is an inherent property1 of the system
which is measured by the photographic plate. The importance of this assumption is
in that it allows one to say that two different apparatus measure the same observable.
Although inherent, the value of an observable may not always be defined.
It will generally be assumed that observables are described by real numbers since this
can always be arranged. It will not be assumed that a measurement yields a sharp
value; after all, a photographic plate does not have perfect resolution. Instead, it is
assumed that an experiment narrows down the value of the observable to some Borel
set of real numbers.
II.1.3 Formulation
The conventional formulation of quantum mechanics is now given. It is loosely based
on formulations such as [d’E76, Ch.3], [d’E89] although there are several differences.
Postulates
• Every type of physical system may be associated with a separable Hilbert space
H and each time t ∈R with a self-adjoint operator Hˆ(t) called the Hamiltonian,
densely defined on H
• a certain subset of instances of a given system may be associated with a non-zero
vector in the associated Hilbert space H (giving the system’s state)
• every physical observable on a system may be associated with a self-adjoint operator
densely defined on the associated Hilbert space
1This assumption is important for now although it is rejected in Bohr’s work, see Chapter III.2.
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in such a way that the following rules hold.
Composite system If system S1 is associated with Hilbert space H1 and Hamil-
tonian Hˆ1(t) and system S2 is associated with Hilbert space H2 and Hamiltonian
Hˆ2(t) then S1+S2, the union of the two systems, is associated with H1 ⊗H2. The
Hamiltonian of the joint system if Hˆ1(t)⊗ 1ˆ + 1ˆ⊗ Hˆ2(t).
If S1 is in a state which may be described by vector |φ〉 and S2 is in a state which
may be described by vector |ψ〉 then S1+S2 is in a state which may be described
by the vector |φ〉|ψ〉.
Time evolution While no measurements are performed on the system the state
evolves in time according to the Schro¨dinger equation
i~
d|ψt〉
dt
= Hˆ(t)|ψt〉 .
~ is a constant the value of which depends on the units used for distance, time and
mass.
For a constant Hamiltonian this is solved by the unitary transformation
|ψt〉 = e−iHˆt/~|ψ0〉 .
Statistical formula The result of measuring a real-valued physical observable A is
inherently non-deterministic. When the system is in state |ψ〉, the probability of
obtaining a result in the Borel set Ω is
‖PˆΩ|ψ〉‖2
‖|ψ〉‖2 ie.
〈ψ|PˆΩ|ψ〉
〈ψ|ψ〉
where {PˆΩ} is the p.v.m. associated with Aˆ.
Ideal measurement For every measuring apparatus it is in principle possible to
construct an apparatus to measure the same observable in an ideal way. This
means that if the measurement is repeated twice rapidly it will yield the same
value on both occasions. (Such a measurement is sometimes called measurement of
the first kind following Pauli. Note that in the case where the system was described
by a state vector this rule amounts to ‘wave function collapse’.)
Commuting observables Suppose Aˆ and Bˆ commute. If A, B, A are measured
ideally in rapid succession then the value of A will be the same on both occasions.
Realisation of states Every state in the Hilbert space of a system is in principle
realisable unless excluded by a superselection rule. (These rules are peculiar to
certain systems and are not described here. Note that this postulate generalises
what is sometimes called the linear superposition rule, namely that the linear com-
bination of states is a state.)
Existence of systems with a state vector If a set Aˆ1, . . . , Aˆn of commuting ob-
servables with p.v.m.s {Pˆ 1Ω}, . . . , {Pˆ nΩ} are measured yielding results in Borel sets
Ω1, . . . ,Ωn respectively, and if Pˆ
1
Ω1
Pˆ 2Ω2 · · · Pˆ nΩn projects onto a space spanned by the
single vector |φ〉 then the system is left in a state described by |φ〉. (Note that
without this rule there is no guarantee that any system could ever be described by
a state vector.)
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Persistence of a state vector If a state may be described by a state vector then
it may be described by a state vector after an ideal measurement is performed.
Notes
What is a rule?
Many formulations include the facts that a system may be associated with a Hilbert
space and an observable with an operator etc. as rules. However, these are devoid of
physics content. These are merely the mathematical models of choice and it is the
statements about these constructions that gives the physics. In the above formulation,
these have therefore been separated.
The situation is analogous to modern algebra where the list of operations on the
underlying set is separated from the list of axioms obeyed by the operations.
What is a state?
It is easily checked that state |φ〉 and c|φ〉 are physically equivalent for c ∈ C \ {0}.
The choice 〈φ|φ〉 = 1 is often imposed although here this convention is not assumed.
Special forms of rules
The postulates above are given in a very general form. More convenient forms may be
derived for special cases. It is these special forms which are most useful in practice.
• The statistical formula may be simplified for the case of a discrete spectrum.
If Aˆ has eigenvalue λ with associated eigenstates forming a space V then the prob-
ability that measuring A will give a value λ is
‖Pˆ |ψ〉‖2
‖|ψ〉‖2
where Pˆ projects onto V .
If in fact the eigenvalue λ is non-degenerate, ie. is associated with the single nor-
malised eigenvector φ, then the probability that measuring A will give a value λ
is
|〈ψ|φ〉|2
‖|ψ〉‖2 .
• An ideal measurement may be defined in terms of its affect on the state vector when
such a vector exists. If an ideal measurement of observable A is made at time t in
such a way that its value is determined to be in the Borel set Ω then the system
state changes discontinuously at time t as a result of the measurement to some
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vector in the space onto which PˆΩ projects, where {PˆΩ} is the p.v.m. associated
with Aˆ.
There is a case in which the wave function collapse is completely determined,
namely if observable A is measured yielding eigenvalue λ which is associated with
a single eigenstate |φ〉. Then the state collapses to |φ〉.
In the more general case, a completely determined collapse is possible if it is as-
sumed that the measurement gives no information other than A lying in set Ω.
In this case the measurement is sometimes called ‘moral’ and the system is left in
state
PˆΩψ
‖PˆΩψ‖
.
The composite system
The composite system rule is particularly important in the interpretation of quantum
mechanics. One might have expected that the state of the composite system would
always take the form |φ〉|ψ〉 where |φ〉 and |ψ〉 are respectively states of S1 and S2.
Thus, S1 + S2 would be associated with the Hilbert space H1 ×H2.
Instead, it is associated with the tensor product space H1 ⊗ H2 in which there are
vectors of the form
|φ1〉|ψ1〉+ |φ2〉|ψ2〉
which cannot be written in the simple form |φ〉|ψ〉 . In other words, in general it is
not possible to associate a state with each subsystem of a composite system.
This bizarre result is sometimes called the non-separability of quantum mechanics. It
leads to nonlocality.
It is interesting to note that this result follows without use of the composite system
rule.
Suppose |φ1〉 and |φ2〉 are states of S1 corresponding to different values of an observ-
able P1. It follows that |φ1〉 and |φ2〉 are orthogonal2. Suppose also that |ψ1〉 and
|ψ2〉 are states of S2 corresponding to different values of an observable P2.
Now it is at least implicit in the rules of quantum mechanics that a composite system
may be in a state |φ〉|ψ〉 for any |φ〉 and |ψ〉, otherwise one could never consider the
state of a subsystem.
So |φ1〉|ψ1〉 and |φ2〉|ψ2〉 are valid states of S1+ S2. But the linear superposition rule
implies that
|φ1〉|ψ1〉+ |φ2〉|ψ2〉
2|φ1〉 and |φ2〉 are in spaces onto which PˆΩ1 and PˆΩ2 respectively project, with Ω1 and Ω2 disjoint.
Here {PˆΩ} is the p.v.m. associated with Pˆ1. It follows from the definition of a p.v.m. that |φ1〉 and
|φ2〉 are orthogonal.
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is a valid state (assuming that no superselection rule excludes this). It may be checked
that this state cannot possibly be expressed in the form3 |φ〉|ψ〉.
Therefore the non-separability of quantum mechanics follows immediately from the
association of separable Hilbert spaces with systems and self-adjoint operators with
observables.
May the rules be derived from physical axioms?
The idea that a system may be described by a Hilbert space is highly abstract and,
as was just shown, has surprising consequences. Can this abstract idea be derived
from postulates of a more physical nature?
Von Neumann suggested that such a programme should be attempted and made
several important contributions in this direction [Neu55] (and later with Birkhoff
[BvN36], see §II.1.7).
There have been many further contributions (eg. [Zie61, Pir64]). However, all these
attempts either involve abstract assumptions after all or fail to fully reproduce quan-
tum mechanics.
Other rules
Von Neumann put forward the following two rules.
• Every vector in Hilbert space is, in principle, realisable.
• Every densely defined self-adjoint operator is associated with some physical observ-
able.
These assumptions are now known to be false. In some quantum mechanical systems,
there are valid states |φ〉, |ψ〉 such that the linear combination |φ〉+|ψ〉 is not realisable
[WWW52]. These restrictions are called superselection rules.
Further, the projection onto |φ〉+|ψ〉, although self-adjoint, is not a physical observable4.
Even in those particular quantum systems where all states are realisable, it is not
clear that all densely defined self-adjoint operators correspond to physical observables.
In particular, if Pˆ corresponds to a physical observable, a function f(Pˆ ) of Pˆ will
typically not be directly observable.
3In this state one can measure P1 and P2 and the rules imply that the results will be correlated,
ie. will yield values corresponding to |φ1〉 and |ψ1〉 or |φ2〉 and |ψ2〉. Such a correlation could not
occur in a state of the form |φ〉|ψ〉.
4If it was, and if it was measured when the system was in state |φ〉, there would be a finite
probability of obtaining the value 1 leaving the system in state (|φ〉+|ψ〉)/√2, a contradiction.
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Nevertheless, these assumptions are of historical importance and feature in some of
the older work on the interpretation of quantum mechanics.
II.1.4 The Heisenberg picture
In the above presentation, called the Schro¨dinger picture, the state of the system
evolves with time and the operators giving observables are fixed.
Now suppose one wanted to calculate probabilities associated with a measurement of
A at time t for 1,000 systems for which the initial state is known. Is it necessary to
apply the Schro¨dinger equation to all 1,000 systems in order to work out their states
at time t?
In fact, it is not. It turns out that there is an operator AˆH(t) which may be measured
at time 0 giving exactly the same results as measuring Aˆ at time t. Therefore, even if
the measurement is really performed at time t, the results may be predicted equally
well by analysing the measurement of AˆH(t) at time 0. (The fact that such an operator
exists is not surprising. After all, the states at time t are related to those at time 0
by a unitary transformation, ie. an isomorphism.)
In this way, it is never necessary to apply the Schro¨dinger equation. Instead, the
operators associated with observables may be said to evolve with time. This is the
Heisenberg picture.
It only remains to derive the form of AˆH(T ). This will be done for the case of a
fixed Hamiltonian. Applying Aˆ to |ψt〉 = exp(−iHˆt/~)|ψ0〉 is in some sense similar
to applying exp(iHˆt/~)Aˆ exp(−iHˆt/~) to |ψ0〉 so a good candidate for AˆH(t) is
exp(iHˆt/~)Aˆ exp(−iHˆt/~).
To check that this is the correct time dependence, let {Pˆ tΩ} be the p.v.m. associated
with Aˆ(t). It is easy to check that the p.v.m. associated with AˆH(t) is
{exp(iHˆt/~)Pˆ tΩ exp(−iHˆt/~)} .
Now consider the probability that measuring A at time t gives a value in the Borel
set Ω. In the Schro¨dinger picture the predicted probability is
〈ψ0|[exp(−iHˆt/~)(t)]†Pˆ tΩ[exp(−iHˆt/~)]|ψ0〉
whereas in the Heisenberg picture the predicted probability is
〈ψ0|[exp(iHˆt/~)(t)Pˆ tΩ exp(−iHˆt/~)(t)]|ψ0〉 .
These are equal.
Further, if in the Schro¨dinger picture the state collapses to a vector in the space
onto which PˆΩ projects, say V , in the Heisenberg picture the state collapses to a
vector in the space onto which {exp(iHˆt/~)Pˆ tΩ exp(−iHˆt/~)} projects and this is
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just exp(iHˆt/~)V . Therefore the Schro¨dinger picture state is still obtained from the
Heisenberg picture state by applying exp(−iHˆt/~).
Hence
AˆH(t) = exp(iHˆt/~)Aˆ exp(−iHˆt/~)
is the required relationship.
This may be given compactly by the differential equation
dAˆH
dt
=
i
~
[Hˆ, AˆH(t)] .(II.1.1)
This is the Heisenberg equation of motion. It is valid even when the Hamiltonian is
not fixed.
II.1.5 Quantisation and the Schro¨dinger representation
Quantisation
Consider a mechanical system with n degrees of freedom. Classically its state is de-
scribed by n generalised coordinates qi, . . . , qn, and n generalised momenta p1, . . . , pn.
The dynamics are given by the Hamiltonian function
H(q1, . . . , qn, p1, . . . , pn) .
It is found that the correct quantum description of such a system requires operators
qˆi and pˆi such that
[qˆi, pˆj ] = i~δij 1ˆ [qˆi, qˆj] = 0ˆ [pˆi, pˆj ] = 0ˆ .(II.1.2)
The commutator [qˆj, pˆj] = i~1ˆ captures the wave nature of matter while the others
establish the freedom to perform simultaneous measurements on different degrees of
freedom. Any operators satisfying these conditions may be used to represent the
observables of generalised coordinates and momenta.
It should be noted at this point that these relationships imply an infinite-dimensional
Hilbert space because in a finite-dimensional space operators may be represented by
matrices and there are no matrices for which5 QP−PQ = i~I.
In finding the quantum Hamiltonian one is guided by the correspondence principle
which states that in certain limits the quantum system should behave classically. It
turns out that this implies that the Hamiltonian in the quantum system should bare
the same relationship to the operators qˆi and pˆi as the classical Hamiltonian does to
the values qi and pi. This can be ambiguous but here only the simplest case is of
interest and in this case there is no ambiguity.
5In fact, the diagonal in QP−PQ always vanishes.
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The case of interest is that of particles described by Cartesian coordinates q1, . . . , qn
in a potential V .
The classical Hamiltonian is
H(q1, . . . , qn, p1, . . . , pn) = p
2/2m+ V (q) .
The quantum Hamiltonian is therefore
Hˆ = “H(qˆ1, . . . , qˆn, pˆ1, . . . , pˆn)” = pˆ
2/2m+ V (qˆ) .(II.1.3)
The Schro¨dinger representation
Still considering the case of particles in a potential with Cartesian coordinates, one of
course may choose any infinite dimensional separable Hilbert space to work with since
these are all isomorphic. A particularly useful Hilbert space, the space of Lesbegue
measurable maps from Rn to C with inner product 〈φ,ψ〉 = ∫
Rn
φ∗ψ [written L2(Rn)],
was used in Schro¨dinger’s formulation of quantum mechanics.
In this separable Hilbert space, the operators defined by (qˆif)(q) = qif(q) and
(pˆif)(q) = −i~(∂f/∂qi)(q) (or strictly the self-adjoint extensions of these opera-
tors) happen to satisfy the commutation relations (II.1.2). These will be chosen to
represent the coordinates and momenta.
The useful thing is that the p.v.m. belonging to the operator qˆi is simply
(PˆΩψ)(q) =
{
ψ(q) (qi∈Ω)
0 (qi 6∈Ω) .
Therefore, when the position q is measured in state ψ, the probability of finding it
in Borel set Ω ⊆ Rn is simply ∫
Ω
|ψ(q)|2dq
provided that ψ is normalised so that
∫
Rn
|ψ(q)|2dq = 1. Thus |ψ(q)|2 gives the
probability density for finding the particle near q!
ψ is called the Schro¨dinger wave function.
Note that in this ‘Schro¨dinger representation’ the Hamiltonian (II.1.3) becomes
Hˆ =
−~2∇2
2m
+ V (x)1ˆ .(II.1.4)
The probability density current
Let ψ be a wave function. A probability density current j for ψ is a function satisfying
∂
∂t
∫
V
|ψ(t,x)|2dx =
∫
S
j(t,x).dS
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for every volume V bounded by a surface S (with suitable smoothness conditions).
A probability density current exists for the standard Hamiltonian, (II.1.4). This may
be derived as follows:
∂
∂t
∫
V
(ψ∗ψ)dV =
∫
V
∂
∂t
(ψ∗ψ)dV
=
∫
V
(
∂ψ
∂t
ψ∗ +
∂ψ∗
∂t
ψ
)
dV
=
1
i~
∫
V
(
ψ∗Hˆψ − ψHˆψ∗
)
dV
=
−~
2im
∫
V
(
ψ∗∇2ψ − ψ∇2ψ∗) dV
=
−~
2im
∫
V
∇. (ψ∗∇ψ − ψ∇ψ∗) dV
=
−~
2im
∫
S
(ψ∗∇ψ − ψ∇ψ∗) .dS .
The last step uses the divergence theorem. So the probability density current is given
by
j =
~
2im
(ψ∗∇ψ − ψ∇ψ∗) = ~
m
Im(ψ∗∇ψ) .
II.1.6 Mixed states and the density matrix
It is sometimes useful to derive the probabilities and expectation values for a physical
observable of a quantum mechanical system when knowledge of the system’s state is
not complete. Suppose that we know that the system is in normalised state |ψi〉 with
probability wi.
It turns out that the properties of such a mixed state are not in general equal to the
properties of any one pure state. But not all the details of the probabilities need to
be known; it is sufficient to know the operator
ρˆ =
∑
i
wiPˆ|ψi〉 =
∑
i
wi|ψi〉〈ψi| .
This is called the density matrix or statistical operator. Two different probability dis-
tributions may lead to the same density matrix, and it is therefore necessary to show
that the density matrix contains all necessary information. Namely, the following
must be expressed in terms of the density matrix:
• the probability of measuring a given value a of an observable A
• the collapsed density matrix after a measurement is performed
• the density matrix at a later time.
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Probabilities Let A be an observable with corresponding operator Aˆ. Suppose
that Aˆ has eigenvalue a and that the projection onto the corresponding space of
eigenvectors is Pˆa. Then
Pr(A=a; ρˆ) =
∑
i
wi Pr(A=a; |ψi〉) =
∑
i
wiTr(Pˆ|ψi〉Pˆa) = Tr
([∑
i
wiPˆ|ψi〉
]
Pˆa
)
.
Therefore
Pr(A=a; ρˆ) = Tr(ρˆPˆa) .
In the more general case where Aˆ has a continuous spectrum, if its p.v.m. is {PˆΩ}
then
Pr(A∈Ω; ρˆ) = Tr(ρˆPˆΩ) .
The collapsed density matrix The collapse of a state is not unique. Here the
particular case of a moral measurement is considered.
It is shown that in the case of a moral measurement the density matrix after the
measurement may be expressed in terms of the density matrix before the measurement
and the result. Presumably this result generalises to other types of measurement.
Suppose a system has density matrix ρˆ =
∑
iwi|ψi〉〈ψi|. And that A is then measured
with the result a. Let Aˆ be the (positive definite) operator corresponding to A and
let Pˆa project onto the space of eigenstates of Aˆ with eigenvalue a.
If the system was in fact in state |ψi〉 before the measurement, it will now be in state
Pˆa|ψi〉. But note that the probability associated with this eventuality is not simply
wi but rather a conditional probability which takes account of the new available
information, namely that measuring A gave a. Write ψi for the assertion that the
original state was |ψi〉 and A=a for the assertion that A measured a. Then
w′i = Pr(ψi | A=a)
=
Pr(ψi and A=a)
Pr(A=a; ρˆ)
=
Pr(ψi) Pr(A=a; |ψi〉)
Pr(A=a; ρˆ)
=
wiTr(Pˆ|ψi〉Pˆa)
Tr(ρˆPˆa)
.
Then the density matrix after the collapse is
ρˆ′ =
∑
i
w′iPˆPˆa|ψi〉 =
∑
i
wi
Tr(Pˆ|ψi〉Pˆa)
Tr(ρˆPˆa)
PˆPˆa|ψi〉 .
But in general
Pˆ|φ〉 =
|φ〉〈φ|
〈φ|φ〉
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so
PˆPˆa|ψi〉 =
Pˆa|ψi〉〈ψi|Pˆ †a
〈ψi|Pˆ †a Pˆa|ψi〉
=
Pˆa|ψi〉〈ψi|Pˆa
〈ψi|Pˆa|ψi〉
=
PˆaPˆ|ψi〉Pˆa
〈ψi|Pˆa|ψi〉
=
PˆaPˆ|ψi〉Pˆa
Tr(Pˆ|ψi〉Pˆa)
.(II.1.5)
(The last step is verified by completing ψi into an orthonormal complete set and using
this set to compute the trace.) Therefore
ρˆ′ =
∑
i
wi
PˆaPˆ|ψi〉Pˆa
Tr(ρˆPˆa)
=
PˆaρˆPˆa
Tr(ρˆPˆa)
.(II.1.6)
Time evolution First consider the time evolution of the projection Pˆ|ψi(t)〉 associ-
ated with the state |ψi(t)〉. It is possible to write |ψi(t)〉= Uˆ (t)|ψi(0)〉 where Uˆ(t) is
unitary and satisfies equations
i~
dUˆ
dt
= Hˆ(t)Uˆ (t)
and
−i~dUˆ
†
dt
= Uˆ †(t)Hˆ(t) .
Now rather like in (II.1.5) it is possible to write
PˆUˆ|ψi〉 =
Uˆ |ψi〉〈ψi|Uˆ †
〈ψi|Uˆ †Uˆ |ψi〉
=
Uˆ |ψi〉〈ψi|Uˆ †
〈ψi|ψi〉 = Uˆ Pˆ|ψi〉Uˆ
† .
Therefore
i~
d
dt
PˆUˆ(t)|ψi〉 = Hˆ(t)Uˆ(t)Pˆ|ψi〉Uˆ
†(t)− Uˆ(t)Pˆ|ψi〉Uˆ †(t)Hˆ(t) .
So
i~
d
dt
PˆUˆ(t)|ψi〉 = [Hˆ(t), PˆUˆ(t)|ψi〉] .
Now ρ(t) is just
∑
iwiPˆUˆ(t)|ψi〉 and therefore
i~
d
dt
ρˆ(t) = [Hˆ(t), ρˆ(t)] .
If Hˆ is constant, this is solved by
ρˆ(t) = e−iHˆt/~ρˆ(0)eiHˆt/~ .
This completes the argument showing that the quantum mechanics of mixed states
may be expressed in terms of the density matrix.
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NB The rules of quantum mechanics may be presented directly in terms of density
matrices. Such a presentation has the advantage of assigning states to all systems.
However, it is traditional to define the rules in terms of pure states and derive the
more general rules as above.
The abstract density matrix
Theorem II.1.3 Let ρˆ =
∑
iwi|ψi〉〈ψi| be a density matrix for some quantum me-
chanical system. Then
• ρˆ is Hermitian
• ρˆ is positive semi-definite
• Tr ρˆ=1.
Proof The projection operators |ψi〉〈ψi| are Hermitian and positive semi-definite
and hence ρˆ has both these properties too.
For the last part,
Tr ρˆ =
∑
wiTr(Pˆ|ψi〉) =
∑
i
wi = 1 .

Definition II.1.4 Any linear operator (defined everywhere and) satisfying the three
conditions in the theorem is called a density matrix.
Then the theorem simply states that every density matrix of a mixed state is an
abstract density matrix. The converse is also true.
Theorem II.1.5 Every density matrix is the density matrix for some ensemble.
Proof Let ρˆ be a density matrix. It follows from the finite trace of ρˆ that ρˆ has a
discrete spectrum. Let |1〉, |2〉, . . . be a complete orthonormal sequence of eigenvectors
with corresponding eigenvalues λ1, λ2, . . . (which necessarily sum to 1). Then
ρˆ =
∑
i
λi|i〉〈i|
so ρˆ is the density matrix of the ensemble with states |1〉, |2〉, . . . in the respective
proportions λ1, λ2, . . . . 
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II.1.7 The Logico-algebraic approach
Classical assertions
An assertion about a classical system may be that a particle has a given position or
momentum, or, more generally, that the position and momentum are in given ranges.
Any such assertion may be identified with a subset of phase space.
It may be that not every subset of phase space corresponds to a useful assertion (eg.
non-measurable sets). Instead, the experimental propositions will correspond to some
field of subsets of phase space.
The assertions may be manipulated using classical logic. This simply corresponds to
manipulating the corresponding subsets. Implication between assertions corresponds
to set inclusion, the negation of an assertion corresponds to the set complement,
disjunction corresponds to set union and conjunction to set intersection.
Quantum assertions
In discussing quantum mechanics, two changes occur.
Firstly, since position and momentum cannot be measured simultaneously, assertions
can only relate to one or the other (in practise to the one which is going to be
measured). A statement fixing the particle’s position and momentum cannot be
checked and, arguably, is physically meaningless.
If one particular observable is picked, assertions may be made about the values of that
observable and these may be manipulated using classical logic as above. However,
in general an assertion will be neither true nor false — this is the second difference.
Instead, there will be a certain probability of it being true.
Of course, one can make assertions about several commuting observables. However,
this amounts to nothing more than making a single assertion about some observable
with a more refined spectrum (any commuting self-adjoint operators may be written
as a functions of a single common self-adjoint operator).
This suggests the following definition of an assertion.
Definition II.1.6 Let H be a Hilbert space. An assertion is a pair (Aˆ,Ω) where Aˆ
is a densely defined self-adjoint operator on H and Ω is a Borel subset of R.
Informally, the semantics of such an assertion is that if the observable Aˆ is measured
then the result will be in Ω.
If one fixed observable A is considered, classical logic can easily be applied to all the
assertions involving Aˆ. It is possible to talk about the value of a measurement of Aˆ
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lying in Ω1 and in Ω2, in Ω1 or in Ω2, or not lying in Ω. Finally one can say that if
it lies in Ω1 this implies that it lies in Ω2.
As in the classical case, these manipulations amount to nothing more than set inter-
section, union, complement and inclusion.
Von Neumann and Birkhoff [BvN36] introduced an elegant abstract representation
for these assertions. The probability of the assertion (Aˆ,Ω) holding in a mixed state
with density matrix ρˆ is just
P [(Aˆ,Ω); ρˆ] = Tr(ρˆPˆΩ)(II.1.7)
where {PˆΩ} is, of course, the p.v.m. associated with Aˆ. Therefore the assertion may be
represented simply by the projection operator PˆΩ. Although this projection may also
represent some other assertion (Aˆ′,Ω′), the abstract form is sufficient for calculating
the probabilities.
The classical logic operations may also be carried out in terms of the projections,
or, more conveniently, in terms of the spaces on to which they project. In terms of
these spaces, conjunction corresponds to intersection, disjunction to the linear span
+, negation to orthogonal complement and implication to set inclusion.
Although all the assertions for all the operators are now neatly represented by a single
structure, the lattice of projection operators on H, they may not all be treated using
classical logic. Mathematically, this is because the lattice of projectors is not boolean,
ie. if we blindly started applying classical logic to all the projectors, basic identities
such as
p ∧ (q ∨ r) = (p ∨ q) ∧ (p ∨ r)
will fail.
Instead, for any particular experiment, the projectors which arise in the p.v.m. for
the relevant operator must be picked out. These form a boolean sublattice and may
be discussed using classical logic.
Probabilities
Up to now the assertions have been discussed. In a given (mixed) state, each assertion,
ie. each projector, is associated with a probability by (II.1.7):
Pˆ 7→ Tr(ρˆPˆ ) .(II.1.8)
In other words, there is a map from the lattice of projectors to [0, 1]. Does this map
behave like a probability?
One might expect that if V andW are disjoint linear subspaces then the corresponding
probabilities should be additive, ie.
Tr(ρˆPˆV ) + Tr(ρˆPˆW ) = Tr(ρˆPˆV+W ) .
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This is false. For example, consider a spin 1
2
system, in a state with z-component of
spin up. The projection associated with z-component of spin up has probability 1
while the projection associated with y-component of spin up has probability 1
2
. These
corresponding spaces are disjoint and yet the probability associated with the span of
the two spaces is not, of course, 11
2
.
In general, probabilities are additive for mutually exclusive assertions which may be
tested at one time but not for assertions which cannot be tested at one time.
Assertions can be tested at one time if their projectors project onto mutually orthog-
onal spaces because then these spaces may appear as eigenspaces for a self-adjoint
operator.
Therefore, (II.1.8) defines a measure in the sense that if V and W are mutually
orthogonal then
Tr(ρˆPˆV ) + Tr(ρˆPˆW ) = Tr(ρˆPˆV+W ) .
More abstractly, (II.1.8) defines a probability measure on every boolean sublattice of
the lattice of projectors.
The map (II.1.8) defines such a measure for each mixed state ρˆ. Gleason’s theorem
[Gle57] is that these are the only measures.
Theorem II.1.7 (Gleason’s theorem) Let V be a separable Hilbert space of di-
mension more than two. Let µ be a map from the set of closed linear subspaces of V
to [0, 1] such that one of the following two (equivalent) conditions hold.
• µ is a measure on every maximal boolean sublattice of the lattice of subspaces
• If U1, U2, . . . are pairwise orthogonal closed linear subspaces then
µ
(⋃
i∈N
Ui
)
=
∑
i∈N
µ(Ui) .
Then there is some abstract density matrix such that
µ(U) = Tr(ρˆPˆU )
for all U . 
Therefore the state of a quantum mechanical system can be defined as a probability
measure, in the above sense, on the projection lattice of the associated Hilbert space.
This may be used to give an alternative formulation of quantum mechanics. However,
the motivation for presenting this material here is different: the idea of projections
as assertions is central to the histories formalism, considered next, which in turn is
central to some modern interpretations of quantum mechanics.
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II.1.8 Spin half
One particular quantum system will be used in examples, that of a particle of spin
half. In such a system the x-component, y-component and z-component of spin are
associated respectively with operators σˆx, σˆy and σˆz which satisfy
[σˆx, σˆy] = iσˆz [σˆy, σˆz] = iσˆx [σˆz, σˆx] = iσˆy .
Each of the operators has eigenvalues ±1. Each eigenvalue is associated with a single
eigenvector typically written |z=↑〉, |z=↓〉, for example, or, when context allows, just
|↑〉 and |↓〉.
Whenever the system is in an eigenstate of one of the components, the other two
components take values up and down with equal probability.
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Chapter II.2
Histories
A history is a sequence of results from different measurements at different times.
Histories are here presented as sequences of measurements which may be analysed
using the rules of quantum mechanics.
However, the importance of histories lies elsewhere. In some interpretations of quan-
tum mechanics, histories are given a fundamental role and it is the rules of quantum
mechanics which are derived. This approach is not considered until the end of Part III.
One of the motivations for discussing histories is the limitations of ordinary quantum
logic (§II.1.7). Since at one time it is possible to measure position or momentum but
not both, classical logic can only be used to discuss either position or momentum,
for example. But, of course, it is quite possible to measure position at one time and
momentum at another.
Histories
In this approach, the idea of a projection operator representing an assertion is gener-
alised to sets of projection operators which represent assertions about different times.
This is clearly most easily presented in the Heisenberg picture.
Let Pˆ be a projection operator. Pˆ (t) may be thought of as the assertion that Pˆ holds
at time t. In the Heisenberg picture it may be defined formally as
Pˆ (t) = eiHˆt/~Pˆ e−iHˆt/~ .
Definition II.2.1 An exhaustive set of exclusive assertions at time t is a sequence
(Pˆ1(t), Pˆ2(t), . . . ) such that∑
α
Pˆα(t) = 1 PˆαPˆβ = δαβPˆα .
25
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A set of alternative histories consists of a sequence t1 < t2 < · · · of times and a
corresponding sequence
(Pˆ 11 (t1), Pˆ
1
2 (t2), . . . ), (Pˆ
2
1 (t1), Pˆ
2
2 (t2), . . . ), . . .
of exhaustive sets of exclusive assertions.
A history in a set of alternative histories is a sequence
(Pˆ 1α1(t1), Pˆ
2
α2
(t2), . . . )
of assertions at different times, one for each set of assertions in the set of histories.
NB The times play no essential role in the formalism. A history may be seen simply
as a sequence of projectors.
Fine-graining / course-graining
One set of alternative histories may be obtained from another by replacing the al-
ternatives Pˆ i1(ti), Pˆ
i
2(ti), . . . with a smaller set of alternatives in which projectors
Pˆ ir1(ti), . . . , Pˆ
i
rk
(ti) are replaced by the projector Pˆ
i
r1
(ti) + · · · + Pˆ irk(ti). This process
is called course-graining (although Omne`s calls it reduction).
The set of alternative histories obtained by this process (which may be repeated
arbitrarily many times) is called a course-graining of the original set of alternative
histories. The opposite relation is fine-graining.
In the case where all the operators at a given time ti are replaced by the identity
operator, the time ti may be completely dropped in the course-grained set of histories.
Although these relations are between sets of alternative histories, it is often convenient
to talk about a course-grained history meaning a history in a course-grained set of
alternative histories. Similarly a fine-grained history will mean a history in a fine-
grained set of alternative histories.
Each history in a course-graining corresponds, in an obvious way, to a set of histories
in the original set of alternative histories. Formally, the course-grained history(∑
α∈S1
Pˆ 1α(t1), . . . ,
∑
α∈Sn
Pˆ nα (tn)
)
in which the projectors Pˆ iα(ti) are from the original fine-grained set of alternative
histories, corresponds to the set
{(Pˆ 1α1(t1), . . . , Pˆ nαn(tn)) | α1∈S1, . . . , αn∈Sn}
of fine-grained histories.
The following property of histories will be important.
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Lemma II.2.2 For a set of alternative histories,∑
α1,... ,αn
Pˆ 1α1(t1) · · · Pˆ nαn(tn) = 1ˆ .
Proof By induction on n.
∑
α1,... ,αn
Pˆ 1α1(t1) · · · Pˆ nαn(tn) =
(∑
α1
Pˆ 1α1(t1)
)( ∑
α2,... ,αn
Pˆ 2α2(t2) · · · Pˆ nαn(tn)
)
=
∑
α1,... ,αn
Pˆ 2α2(t2) · · · Pˆ nαn(tn) · · · .

Probabilities
In the conventional rules, what is the probability of measuring P1, P2, . . . , Pn and
obtaining 1 for each? Here it is assumed that these are indeed physical observables
(in practice histories are only useful if they are) and, more importantly, that they are
measured morally.
This probability may be given by
Pr(P1, . . . , Pn) = Pr(P1)× Pr(P1|P2)× . . . × Pr(Pn|P1, . . . , Pn−1)
where Pr(Q|Q1, . . . , Qr) means the probability of measuring 1 for Q given that
Q1, . . . , Qr have been measured in that order and have all been found to be equal to
1. Now by (II.1.6), the right hand side is given by
Tr(Pˆ1ρˆPˆ1)× Tr(Pˆ2[Pˆ1ρˆPˆ1]Pˆ2)
Tr(Pˆ1ρˆPˆ1)
× · · · × Tr(Pˆn[Pˆn−1 · · · Pˆ1ρˆPˆ1 · · · Pˆn−1]Pˆn)
Tr(Pˆn−1 · · · Pˆ1ρˆPˆ1 · · · Pˆn−1)
.
Thus
Pr(Pˆ1, . . . , Pˆn) = Tr(Pˆn · · · Pˆ1ρˆPˆ1 · · · Pˆn) .
This formula is used to define probabilities for histories.
Note that it is inevitable that the probabilities depend on the order of the projectors.
For example, consider a particle of spin 1
2
with the projectors Pˆ and Qˆ corresponding
respectively to σx = ~/2 and σy = ~2. It is clearly more probable to obtain all 1s
when measuring P several times followed by Q several times rather than measuring
them alternately.
Consistency
Above it was shown that a course-grained history corresponds to a set of fine-grained
histories. Can the course-grained history be considered as a disjunction of the corre-
sponding fine-grained histories? Does its probability equal the sum of the probabilities
of the fine-grained histories? This question is now analysed.
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Given a fixed set of alternative histories, a history (Pˆ 1α1(t1), . . . , Pˆ
n
αn
(tn)) may be
denoted simply by the sequence (α1, . . . , αn) of indices. The notation [α] will be
used as a shorthand for such a sequence.
Now given a particular set of alternative histories and an initial state ρˆ, define for
any two histories [α], [α′],
D([α], [α′]) = Tr[Pˆ 1α1(t1) · · · Pˆ nαn(tn)ρˆPˆ nα′n(tn) · · · Pˆ 1α′1(t1)] .
D is called the decoherence functional (for state ρˆ). Note that D([α], [α]) gives the
probability of [α] and that
D([α], [α′]) = Tr[Pˆ 1α1(t1) · · · Pˆ nαn(tn)ρˆPˆ nα′n(tn) · · · Pˆ 1α′1(t1)]
= Tr[{Pˆ 1α1(t1) · · · Pˆ nαn(tn)ρˆPˆ nα′n(tn) · · · Pˆ 1α′1(t1)}
†]∗
= Tr[Pˆ 1α′
1
(t1) · · · Pˆ nα′n(tn)ρˆPˆ nαn(tn) · · · Pˆ 1α1(t1)]∗
= D([α′], [α])∗
using the facts that Tr(A†) = Tr(A)∗ and that (AˆBˆ)† = Aˆ†Bˆ† and that all the
operators are self-adjoint.
Now let [α] be a course-grained history with its i-th projector Pˆ iαi(ti) equal to∑
β∈Si
Qˆiβ(ti).
Then
D([α], [α]) =
∑
[β] ∈ S1 × S2 × · · ·
[γ] ∈ S1 × S2 × · · ·
D([β], [γ])
=
∑
[β]∈S1×S2×···
D([β], [β]) +
∑
[β] ∈ S1 × S2 × · · ·
[γ] ∈ S1 × S2 × · · ·
[β] 6= [γ]
D([β], [γ]) .
(II.2.1)
If the last term vanished, this result would give the required probabilities sum rule
giving the probability of the course-grained history as the sum of the probabilities
of the corresponding fine-grained histories. Note that the last term is necessary real
because it sums conjugate pairs. This motivates the following definition.
Definition II.2.3 A set of alternative histories is weakly decoherent or consis-
tent with respect to an initial state ρˆ if for every two distinct histories [α] and [α′]
in the set, ReD([α], [α′])=0. The set is decoherent or medium decoherent if for
every two distinct histories [α] and [α′] in the set, D([α], [α′]) = 0.
(II.2.1) leads immediately to the following theorem.
Theorem II.2.4 If a set of histories is weekly decoherent (with respect to initial state
ρˆ) then the probability of a history in any course-graining of this set (with respect to
ρˆ) is the sum of the probabilities of the corresponding fine-grained histories. 
CHAPTER II.2. HISTORIES 29
In practice, the approaches to establishing decoherence generally establish decoher-
ence and not merely weak decoherence. Therefore weak decoherence, although suffi-
cient for the theorem, will not be very useful in practice.
Why are consistent sets of histories important? If the probabilities in a fine-graining
do not add up to the probability of the original course-grained history, then the
fact that finer measurements are being made is affecting the overall chances of the
course-grained history occurring. To sum up,
In a decoherent set of histories, every fine-grained measurement is providing extra
information without affecting the overall chance a any course-grained history.
Therefore, if one wants to obtain information about a quantum system by experiment,
without disturbing the results of later experiments, only consistent histories may be
considered!
Decoherence, pure initial states, and records
Let ρˆ = |ψ〉〈ψ| with |ψ〉 normalised, the projector onto the space spanned by |ψ〉. Let
[α] range over a set of alternative histories. Then
D([α], [α′]) = Tr[Pˆ 1α1(t1) · · · Pˆ nαn(tn)ρˆPˆ nα′n(tn) · · · Pˆ 1α′1(t1)]
= Tr[|ψ〉〈ψ|(Pˆ 1α′
1
(t1) · · · Pˆ nα′n(tn))†Pˆ 1α1(t1) · · · Pˆ nαn(tn)|ψ〉〈ψ|]
= 〈ψ|[|ψ〉〈ψ|(Pˆ 1α′
1
(t1) · · · Pˆ nα′n(tn))†Pˆ 1α1(t1) · · · Pˆ nαn(tn)|ψ〉〈ψ|]|ψ〉
= 〈ψ |(Pˆ 1α′
1
(t1) · · · Pˆ nα′n(tn))†Pˆ 1α1(t1) · · · Pˆ nαn(tn) |ψ〉 .
Therefore an equivalent condition for the set of histories to decohere with respect
to initial state |ψ〉 is that Pˆ 1α1(t1) · · · Pˆ nαn(tn) |ψ〉 and Pˆ 1α′1(t1) · · · Pˆ nα′n(tn) |ψ〉 should be
orthogonal for all [α] 6=[α′].
If the histories do decohere, by Lemma II.2.2, |ψ〉 may be written as the sum∑
α1,... ,αn
Pˆ 1α1(t1) · · · Pˆ nαn(tn) |ψ〉
of orthogonal vectors.
This alternative definition of decoherence shows that decoherence is equivalent to the
existence of records1 . Suppose one were to perform all the experiments of a set of
alternative histories and lose the results. Is it possible to reconstruct these by doing
a further experiment on the system?
According to the conventional rules, if the experiment gives results α1, . . . , αn then
the system is left in state Pˆ 1α1(t1) · · · Pˆ nαn(tn) |ψ〉. An experiment to determine which
1Note that the meaning of this term varies in the literature on histories.
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of these states the system is in, is of course possible iff 2 these states are mutually
orthogonal. But is has just been shown that this is the case iff the set of decoherent
histories decoheres (with respect to |ψ〉).
Prediction and retrodiction
A history (α1, . . . , αn) may be split into two parts (αi1 , . . . , αik) and (αj1 , . . . , αjl)
each of which is a history in some (different) coarse-graining. Given an initial state,
define the conditional probability
p
(
(αi1 , . . . , αik) | (αj1 , . . . , αjl)
)
=
p(α1, . . . , αn)
p(αj1 , . . . , αjk)
.
Consider an experiment in which P 1α1(t1), . . . , P
n
αn
(tn) are measured. It is tempting
to think of the above probability as the probability that measurements αi1 , . . . , αik
give 1 given that measurements αj1 , . . . , αjl give 1. But, in general, that probability
is given by
p(α1, . . . , αn)∑
βi1 , . . . , βik
βj1 = αj1 , . . . , βjl = αjl
p(β1, . . . , βn)
.
However, if the set of alternative histories decoheres then these are equal.
Classical logic
Definition II.2.5 A proposition over a set of alternative histories is a subset of the
histories in this set.
Of course, the propositions over a set of alternative histories may be discussed using
classical logic by identifying conjunction, disjunction, negation and implication with,
respectively, set intersection, set union, set complement and set inclusion.
However, this will not give a useful implication relation. In a given system we would
expect to have a⇒ b even if b is not a subset of a, provided that the histories in b−a
have probability zero. In effect, histories of probability zero can be neglected.
Suppose a system with initial state ρˆ is being considered. Write a ≡ b if all the
histories in a∆b (the set-theoretic symmetric difference of a and b) have probability
zero. This relation is clearly reflexive and symmetric and it also transitive since for
any sets p, q, r,
p∆r ⊆ (p∆q) ∪ (q∆r) .
2Strictly, the if clause depends on von Neumann’s dubious postulate that every self-adjoint opera-
tor belongs to some physical observable. Nevertheless, decoherence implies that different results leave
to orthogonal states and this seems significant even if there does not happen to be an experiment
available to distinguish these states.
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In order for the operations ∧, ∨ and ¬ (identified with ∩, ∪ and set complement) to
carry over to equivalence classes, it is necessary to check that ≡ is a congruence with
respect to these operations. To see that this is true, suppose a ≡ a′ and b ≡ b′. Then
a ∧ b ≡ a′ ∧ b′ follows from (p ∩ q)∆(p′ ∩ q′) ⊆ (p∆p′) ∪ (q∆q′)
a ∨ b ≡ a′ ∨ b′ follows from (p ∪ q)∆(p′ ∪ q′) ⊆ (p∆p′) ∪ (q∆q′)
¬b ≡ ¬b′ follows from (S − p)∆(S − p′) = p∆p′ if p, p′ ⊆ S .
Then by a standard result of universal algebra3 ∧, ∨ and ¬ may be defined naturally
on equivalence classes and, like the original operations, satisfy the axioms for a com-
plemented boolean lattice (in the algebraic sense, ie. no partial order is assumed).
Implication may then be defined by
[a]⇒ [b] iff [a] = [a] ∨ [b]
(this is the standard way for defining a partial order on an algebraic lattice) thus
recovering classical logic.
NB The above procedure is different to that presented by Omne`s [Omn88a, Omn90].
There, a ⇒ b means that all the histories in a−b have probability 0 (although it is
not explicitly defined in this form). a = b is written for a ⇒ b and b ⇒ a so that =
coincides with the equivalence above.
However, Omne`s does not then redefine⇒, ∧, ∨ and ¬ in terms of equivalence classes,
a gap in the paper’s presentation. Omne`s directly proves the 20 or so rules of abstract
logic (ie. properties of a boolean lattice) whereas here we have taken the more elegant
route of inferring these immediately from the lattice structure of set theory by using
a theorem of universal algebra.
Note that the above procedure is valid whether or not the set of alternative histories
weakly decoheres. Omne`s writes that conventional logic applies iff consistency con-
ditions are satisfied. However, neither his approach to logic nor the above approach
seem to support this conclusion. Any set of histories represents a valid programme of
experiments and the results of such a programme can always be discussed in classical
logic. 
Now that logic has fully been constructed for equivalence classes, what can be said
about the original propositions? Without attempting to reconstruct all of logic, one
can just define implication between propositions by
a⇒ b iff [a]⇒ [b] .
It is this type of implication which is used in physical reasoning.
Now what is the importance of consistent sets of histories? Suppose a, b are proposi-
tions in some set of histories and a′, b′ correspond to the fine-grainings of the histories
in a and b in some fine-grained set of histories. Now if these sets of histories are consis-
tent then a⇒ b iff a′ ⇒ b′. Of course, if a′′ and b′′ correspond to the fine-grainings of
3See eg. [Gra68] or the beginning of [Hen88].
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a and b in some other consistent fine-grained set of histories then this is also equivalent
to a′′ ⇒ b′′.
Therefore, any physical implications which may be derived in one consistent set of
histories is also valid in any other consistent set of histories. It is this result which
allows histories to be used consistently in interpretation.
Bibliography Most of the work on decoherent histories is concerned with the in-
terpretation of quantum mechanics, see Chapters III.9–III.8. Many of the papers do
include careful descriptions of the histories formalism and of the associated proba-
bilities, logic and consistency conditions. Here, pointers to some of these papers are
given.
Histories were introduced by Griffiths [Gri84] in a slightly different form to the above.
This paper also introduced the ideas of consistent sets of histories, and the probability
measure for histories.
Histories were defined in a form closer to that used above by Omne`s [Omn88a, Omn90,
Omn92]. These papers developed the idea of applying classical logic to decohering
sets of histories.
Another variant of the histories formalism plays a central role in the work of Gell-
Mann and Hartle on interpretation and is described in many of their papers, partic-
ularly [GMH90a, GMH90b, Har93c].
Other papers which include a description of the formalism include [Hal93a, Hal94,
DK94].
One aspect of histories not discussed above is the notion of equivalence between
histories. Discussions are included in [Har91, GMH90b, DK94, GMH94].
There have been a small number of papers concerned with the histories formalism per
se, eg. [Dio`94a, Dio`94b].
Part III
Interpretation
Nine interpretations of quantum mechanics are discussed.
The first consists of the rules of quantum mechanics as already
presented. This approach derives its importance from the fact that
most people learn quantum mechanics in this form; many never
learn any other. The chapter points out the ambiguities and diffi-
culties inherent in the rules.
The second chapter discusses Bohr’s ideas in which the rules are
rapped up in an interpretation of sorts. The third chapter discusses
a variant in which the observer-system cut in the rules is fixed
between mind and body.
The fourth chapter discusses hidden variables. This is not a partic-
ular interpretation but rather defines a programme for finding an
interpretation.
Chapters five and six discuss two variants of a more radical inter-
pretation in which there are many realities.
Chapter seven discusses Bohm’s interpretation.
Finally, chapters eight and nine present two modern interpretations
based on histories.
In each chapter, the interpretation is introduced and formulated.
Attention is then given to modelling the process of measurement
within the interpretation. Then, determinism, locality and any rel-
evant philosophical issues are discussed. Finally, the interpretation
is criticised and variants of the interpretation are noted.
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Chapter III.1
The Orthodox interpretation
Introduction
Most physicists think of quantum mechanics in terms of the rules presented in Chap-
ter II.1. These rules, without any further interpretation, can perhaps be called the
orthodox interpretation of quantum mechanics.
Formulation
The formulation of orthodox quantum mechanics is as in Chapter II.1.
Measurement
The rules of quantum mechanics are formulated in terms of external measurements
on a quantum system. measurement may also be modelled within a system as follows.
Suppose a system has eigenstates |φ1〉, |φ2〉,. . . corresponding to values 1, 2, . . . of
some observable. Suppose a measuring apparatus has initial state |χ〉 and states |χ1〉,
|χ2〉,. . . corresponding to the pointer showing values 1, 2, . . . . (Such a description
for a macroscopic pointer is almost obscenely simplified but that does not matter for
now.)
Suppose an interaction may be found in which
|χ〉|φi〉
evolves over a very short time into
|χi〉|φi〉 .
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In such circumstances one might say that the apparatus is measuring the observable.
The measurement problem
The main difficulty with the orthodox interpretation is that while it stipulates what
happens when external measurements are made on a quantum system, different results
are obtained when the same process of measurement is treated within the theory as
above. This is called the measurement problem.
Because of this problem, the theory is ambiguous. One never knows whether to treat
an interaction within the theory or as an external measurement. Or in other words,
one does not know what is an external measurement — where the system-observer
cut should be placed.
The following example illustrates the different predictions for a measurement treated
as an interaction and for an external measurement.
Example In a benign version of the famous story, Schro¨dinger measures the x
component of spin of an electron finding it to be ↑. He then locks his cat in a box,
telling it to measure the z component of spin. (Surely any cat belonging to the great
physicist would be up to such a task.)
The cat knows that the electron’s state is
(|z=↑〉 + |z=↓〉)/
√
2 .
It obtains a result of either ↑ or ↓ and writes it down. It believes that the electrons
state has collapsed into |z=↑〉 or |z=↓〉 respectively. To an outside observer, the cat
would expect these to appear, together with his own state, as
|cat wrote ‘up’〉|z=↑〉 or |cat wrote ‘down’〉|z=↓〉 .(III.1.1)
Sitting in his office, Schro¨dinger thinks about his cat and the electron. He decides to
treat them both using quantum theory. The system’s initial state is
|initial cat〉
(
|z=↑〉 + |z=↓〉
)
/
√
2
and, by linearity, he expects that the state will now have become(
|cat wrote ‘up’〉|z=↑〉+ |cat wrote ‘down’〉|z=↓〉
)
/
√
2 .(III.1.2)
If Schro¨dinger opens the box and has a look at the cat’s result and checks the mea-
surement, he will find the two in agreement. If he repeats the whole process many
times, the result will be up or down in equal proportions. This he will readily explain
in terms of (III.1.2). It is also entirely consistent with (III.1.1).
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But suppose that instead he carefully checks which of the following four orthogonal
states the cat-electron system is in:(
|‘up’〉|z=↑〉+ |‘down’〉|z=↓〉
)
/
√
2(
|‘up’〉|z=↑〉 − |‘down’〉|z=↓〉
)
/
√
2(
|‘up’〉|z=↓〉+ |‘down’〉|z=↑〉
)
/
√
2(
|‘up’〉|z=↓〉 − |‘down’〉|z=↑〉
)
/
√
2 .
(III.1.3)
He expects to find the state to be the first of these with certainty.
If, on the other hand, the cat has succeeded in collapsing the wave function as it
believes, the two possible states (III.1.1) may be written
1
2
(
|‘up’〉|z=↑〉 + |‘down’〉|z=↓〉
)
± 1
2
(
|“up”〉|z=↑〉 − |“down”〉|z=↓〉
)
and therefore the first two states above will occur equally often. 
Decoherence
The problem above has been partly solved by understanding of a process called deco-
herence. The point is that it is not feasible to isolate the cat in the box so perfectly
from its environment that there will be no record of whether it wrote ‘up’ or ‘down’.
There will be some air particle of photon somewhere in states |u〉 or |d〉 correlated
with what the cat wrote. Then instead of the state (III.1.2), the system as viewed by
Schro¨dinger has state(
|u〉 |‘up’〉 |z=↑〉 + |d〉 |‘down’〉 |z=↓〉
)
/
√
2 .(III.1.4)
Then it is easy to check that, after all, Schro¨dinger should expect to obtain either of
the first two states in (III.1.3) with equal probability.
The process of decoherence explains why, in practice, there is no ambiguity in the
predictions of quantum theory when the measuring apparatus is macroscopic.
To sum up, the orthodox interpretation of quantum mechanics is ambiguous in that
it does not determine the observer-system cut. If there is no such cut, the theory
predicts an absurd universe in which nothing has a state.
In practice, the environment of a macroscopic system, treated within quantum me-
chanics, simulates the effect of an outside observer as defined in quantum mechanics.
This is decoherence. The effect means that the ambiguity in quantum theory gets
blurred at larger scales.
The measurement problem is devastating. The orthodox interpretation of quantum
mechanics is practically useful but conceptually unacceptable.
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Determinism
The orthodox interpretation accepts a fundamental non-determinism in the laws of
the microscopic world.
However, this non-determinism only occurs when an external measurement is made.
It is not at all clear what constitutes an external measurement and therefore not at
all clear when non-deterministic transitions occur.
Locality
The orthodox interpretation of quantum mechanics is nonlocal in the sense that an
action at one point in space may have repercussions at a distant point without any
apparent intervening mechanism. This well known result is due to Einstein, Podolsky
and Rosen (EPR) [EPR35].
In the best know version of their thought experiment, due to Bohm [Boh51, pp.614–
623], a particle of spin zero decays into two particles of spin half which fly off in
opposite directions. In the basis of eigenstate of z-component of spin, the two particle
system is in state
(|↑〉|↓〉 + |↓〉|↑〉) .
Neither particle has a definite z-component of spin.
But if the z-component of spin of the first particle is measured then the entire two
particle system collapses into the state |↑〉|↓〉 or into the state |↓〉|↑〉. In other words,
the measurement performed on one particle has caused the other particle, which may
be distant, to obtain a definite z-component of spin (anti-correlated with the first).
However, this nonlocality cannot be used to send signals to a distant point. The
remote observer cannot tell whether his or her measurement is itself causing the state
to collapse or is revealing an already collapsed value.
This feature of orthodox quantum mechanics is, of course, related to non-separability :
distant particles cannot in general be assigned separate states.
Philosophy
The orthodox interpretation attempts, as much as possible, to give an ontological
model of physical systems using the concept of the quantum state.
However, the interpretation does not fully succeed in giving such a model because the
formalism cannot sensibly be applied to the entire universe.
One solution to this problem is to abandon any attempt at an ontological model and
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to put quantum mechanics on a purely epistemological footing. This is the approach
of Bohr and it is discussed in the next chapter.
However, most physicists simply accept the above presentation. Since the ambiguity
is imperceptible in practice, why worry about it?
Criticism
Even if the interpretation works in practice, the conventional interpretation cannot
provide an ontological model for the universe because of the measurement problem.
This has been the main motivation in the search for a new interpretation.
The measurement problem manifests itself in other ways. For example, no one has
shown how to recover classical physics from orthodox quantum mechanics in the
large-number-of-bound-particles-high-temperature-limit. The most obvious barrier to
achieving this is that if a large object is treated using orthodox quantum mechanics,
its wave function does not collapse and it will not have a well defined position let
alone fully classical behaviour.
Essentially the same problem may be expressed by saying that orthodox quantum
mechanics cannot be applied to closed systems (such as the universe).
At the same time, nonlocality is considered totally unacceptable by some physicists.
In particular, Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen [EPR35] do not even consider the possi-
bility that locality might fail.
Others have found non-determinism unacceptable. Here again, Einstein’s view, that
God does not play with dice, is particularly famous.
Variations
Instead of leaving the observer-system split completely open, it is sometimes stated
that anything macroscopic should be treated as an observer. This means that when-
ever a macroscopic object gets into a superposition of states, its wave function col-
lapses.
Although very popular, this version suffers from multiple vaguenesses. How big is
macroscopic? A cat? A catfish? A cation? Also, in which basis does the wave
function collapse? And how closely bound do particles have to be to be considered
part of one macroscopic object?
More seriously, this view may be ruled out by modern evidence for quantum effects
in macroscopic objects: tunneling in Superconducting Quantum Interference Devices
(SQUIDs) [Leg80, Leg84, Leg85, Leg86, Leg87], charge density waves [Bar79, Bar80,
GZCB81] and the photon field in a ring laser [LCSM81].
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Conclusion
The orthodox interpretation works well in practice but cannot provide a model for
the universe.
Bibliography
The ideas of quantum states and of operators corresponding to observables are due
to von Neumann [Neu55] and Dirac [Dir47]. More up to date texts include [d’E76,
Sch73b, LL77].
Decoherence is investigated in [FV63, Zur81, Zur82, CL83, JZ85, Zur86, Zur91] and
[GMH90b]. Note that some of these authors argue that decoherence totally destroys
large-scale quantum effects whereas this chapter has followed [Bel75, d’E90] in arguing
that decoherence destroys quantum effects in practice but not in principle.
Chapter III.2
Bohr’s interpretation
Any ontology whatsoever is ruled out by the very nature of reality as
revealed throughout quantum theory.
Niels Bohr
Introduction
The orthodox interpretation is orthodox not only in the sense that most physicists
use it but also in the sense that it aims to emulate classical physics in assigning states
to quantum systems.
In the orthodox interpretation a system always has a well-defined state. It is only
the observables which are not always sharply defined. In other words, the process of
measurement cannot be controlled.
There is a less orthodox approach which was developed by Bohr and his colleagues in
Copenhagen. It is often called the Copenhagen interpretation1. This approach aban-
dons the idea of talking ontologically about quantum objects. Instead, it is decided
essentially by fiat that one should only talk about properties of quantum objects by
talking about the measuring apparatus. The measuring apparatus are assumed to be-
have classically and may be described using classical physics and everyday language.
It is very difficult to get used to this approach. Bohr’s own presentation style is
highly idiosyncratic although this barrier has been removed by the secondary litera-
ture. Even so, Bohr’s ideas are worded vaguely and intentionally lack the customary
mathematical formulation. More importantly, the very idea of introducing a physical
theory which is epistemological — describing what knowledge can be obtained about
1However, this chapter is dedicated specifically to Bohr’s views while the Copenhagen interpreta-
tion is a more general term which includes the subtly different approach of Heisenberg and others.
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a system rather that describing the nature of the system — is extremely unfamiliar
in physics.
Nevertheless, for those who are happy with a physical theory describing experimental
results without giving a model for what is going on, Bohr’s approach has a number
of advantages.
Formulation
Bohr accepts that calculations should be performed using the quantum rules of Chap-
ter II.1. Bohr’s interpretational ideas are centred around two postulates. Bohr
presents these in different ways in different papers. The following wording is taken
from [Sch73a] and based closely on Bohr’s own wordings.
Two postulates
Quantum postulate Every quantum phenomenon has a feature of wholeness or
individuality which never occurs in classical physics and which is symbolized by
the Planck quantum of action.
Buffer postulate The description of the apparatus and of the results of observation,
which forms part of the description of a quantum mechanical phenomenon, must be
expressed in the concepts of classical physics (including those of “everyday life”),
eliminating the Planck constant of action.
(Note that Bohr, who distrusted technical terminology, did not name the second
postulate; this name is due to [Sch73a].)
An attempt will now be made to make some sense of these.
The quantum postulate In the quantum postulate, Bohr discusses the quan-
tum phenomenon by which he means a property of a quantum object attached to a
particular experimental apparatus. Examples of quantum phenomena would be ‘an
electron in a double slit experiment behaves like a wave’ or ‘a proton in a photographic
emulsion traces a definite path through space’.
The ‘wholeness’ or ‘individuality’ of the phenomenon is meant to imply a ban on
discussing properties of the object or apparatus in isolation. Statements such as ‘a
muon always behaves like a wave’ or ‘a pion always has a definite position’, which are
merely false in the orthodox interpretation, are here excluded as meaningless because
they do not involve a description of the quantum apparatus.
This restriction on our freedom of speech applies to experiments which are “symbol-
ized by the Planck quantum of action”. This means that it only applies to exper-
iments in which one is trying to talk about position and momentum, for example,
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to an accuracy of order ∆x∆p ≈ h. When talking about macroscopic phenomena,
their is no such wholeness and one is free to talk about the object and the experiment
independently.
The buffer postulate Since one is not allowed to talk about properties of the
quantum object on its own, one had better be allowed to talk about the apparatus or
else physicists would be doomed to silence. The buffer postulate permits talk about
the apparatus using everyday language and classical physics.
The buffer postulate refers to any item which is being treated as an apparatus. There
is therefore flexibility in the object–apparatus divide. The buffer postulate talks
about eliminating the Planck constant of action meaning that one is only free to
treat something as an apparatus when one is observing it with an accuracy less than
∆x∆p ≈ h.
The interaction
The quantum postulate implies that there is a non-negligible interaction between
the object and apparatus. Otherwise, the object and apparatus could hardly be
an unanalysable whole. Note that this contrasts with classical physics where the
interaction involved in an observation may be made arbitrarily small and ultimately
neglected.
Using the buffer postulate, Bohr argues that the interaction is not separably account-
able. For example, one cannot determine how much momentum is transferred from the
screen to the electron in a double slit experiment. The reason is that the buffer postu-
late insists that effects of order h are neglected in treating the apparatus. Therefore,
the treatment of the apparatus is not sensitive enough to determine the interaction.
In Bohr’s style of language, this is expressed by saying that the interaction is an
integral part of the phenomenon. It cannot be analysed on its own.
The object
Since it is impossible to determine the nature of the interaction in a particular ex-
periment, it is also impossible to assign independent properties to a specific quantum
object. There is no concept of the state of an object.
Properties of an object may only be defined through specific apparatus, ie. in the
context of a specific phenomenon. For example, for a particle travelling in a photo-
graphic emulsion, the position may be defined as the (newer) edge of the track. In
this phenomenon, momentum will be undefined.
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Complementarity
When different phenomena are
• incompatible in the sense that the different apparatus cannot be set up simultane-
ously and
• mutually complete in the sense that both give important information about the
object which in classical terms would combine to give complete information
then Bohr calls the phenomena complementary.
Measurement
As Bohr insists that the interaction cannot be surveyed, measurement cannot be
modelled in this interpretation.
Determinism
The view-point of complementarity allows us indeed to avoid any futile
discussion about an ultimate determinism or indeterminism of physical
events, by offering a straightforward generalisation of the very idea of
causality.
Niels Bohr, [Boh39, p.25]
In other words, ‘futile’ discussion about ultimate determinism or indeterminism is
avoided by Bohr’s ban on looking for an ontological model for quantum theory.
Bohr regarded determinism as being complementary to the space-time description.
Ie. a particle in an emulsion traces a definite path in space-time but behaves non-
deterministically while a particle in a vacuum behaves deterministically but does not
trace a definite path in space-time. Thus, complementarity generalises causality in
that causality becomes just one possible type of behaviour.
Locality
The formulation of the EPR paradox is not possible in Bohr’s view since one cannot
talk about the state of an unobserved physical system. The only type of statement
Bohr would allow about a spin zero particle decaying into particles of spin half is
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that detectors placed at a distance will register opposite spins. This is a phenomenon
which cannot be “split”. Ie. one may not talk about the intervening state and the
paradox does not arise.
However, there is still a form of nonlocality in that the phenomenon that cannot be
split spreads over two distant sights [BH93, §7.2].
Philosophy
Bohr believed that quantum mechanics forces us into an uncompromising positivist
stance, ie. recognising only empirical facts and denying science a role in determining
the reality behind such facts. This in particular meant that he rejected any attempt
to find an ontological theory of the quantum world.
Criticism
Most physicists are not positivists and are therefore not comfortable with Bohr’s
views.
Bohr argued that the unpredictability and uncontrollability of quantum effects ruled
out the possibility of an underlying ontology. It has already been pointed out [BH93,
§2.5] that this view is not sustainable; chaotic dynamical systems are unpredictable
and uncontrollable but may be explained in terms of an underlying deterministic
ontology. In any event, several ontological models for quantum theory have been
suggested.
Bohr believed that the measurement problem was purely a result of futile talk about
states and the like. It could, however, be argued that Bohr was covering up this very
real problem by placing restrictions on the type of questions one is allowed to ask.
Conclusion
Bohr’s view is historically very important. It is an epistemological interpretation in
good agreement with experiment. However, Bohr’s arguments against an ontology are
unconvincing and his positivism may be covering up ambiguities rather than resolving
them.
Bibliography
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Chapter III.3
Mind causes collapse
Introduction
Schro¨dinger’s equation cannot be accepted on its own because our minds perceive
macroscopic objects as always having definite states, not linear superpositions of
definite states.
It is therefore possible to assume that the unitary mechanics applies to the entire
physical universe and that wave function collapse occurs at the last possible moment,
in the mind itself. This, of course, assumes a non-physical mind.
This interpretation was hinted at by Von Neumann [Neu55, §VI.1] and later advocated
in [LB39, §11], [Wig67]. It was at one time known as the standard interpretation.
Formulation
The idea that consciousness causes the wave function to collapse may be formulated
as follows.
The rules of quantum mechanics are correct but there is only one system which
may be treated with quantum mechanics, namely the entire material world.
There exist external observers which cannot be treated within quantum mechan-
ics, namely human (and perhaps animal) minds, which perform measurements
on the brain causing wave function collapse.
Of course, the state of particles in a persons brain will be correlated with the state of
particles outside the person’s brain so the collapse will have far reaching consequences.
For example, assuming that Schro¨dinger’s cat is not itself conscious, its fate will be
finally decided after Schro¨dinger first takes a look at it, when the information enters
his mind.
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This interpretation makes a prediction that is, in principle, experimentally testable,
namely that some particles in the human brain do not obey Schro¨dinger’s equation.
For example, if a person’s mind measures say the position of a particle in the person’s
brain at time t, this will have an effect which may be observed by measuring the
momentum of the same particle at times t−ǫ and t+ǫ.
Measurement
In this interpretation, the only true measurement is the mind measuring the brain.
Determinism
This interpretation accepts that the universe is inherently non-deterministic.
Locality
This interpretation accepts that the universe is nonlocal; when the mind measures the
brain it causes wave-function collapse which may have consequences far beyond the
brain. In the EPR situation, for example, a conscious observation of one particle’s
z-component of spin causes the distant particle to obtain a definite z-component of
spin.
Philosophy
This interpretation depends on a particular ontological view of the mind-body ques-
tion. Many physicists have criticised the interpretation because it does not accord
with their own understanding of the mind-body question without in any way making
clear that this is the reason.
Therefore, in order to put the debate about this interpretation into its correct philo-
sophical context, a brief description of the main philosophical approaches to the mind
is required here.
Idealism
Russell uses the term idealism for “the doctrine that whatever exists, or at any rate
whatever can be known to exist, must be in some sense mental.”. It is a monistic the-
ory as it recognises only one type of entity. It may be traced back to the Irish bishop
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Figure III.3.1: Some philosophies of the mind
George Berkeley [Ber10, Ber13] This belief has been very popular with philosophers
over the ages.
The main argument against idealism is that elements of the physical world evolve
with time in a way which is often predictable and which does not depend on whether
or not I am looking at them. Even if this does not prove that these items have an
independent existence, it makes it a lot simpler to assume that they do. And there
is, after all, no evidence whatsoever that they do not.
(One interpretation of quantum mechanics, the many-minds interpretation [Chap-
ter III.6] is arguably idealistic.)
Materialism
At the other extreme is materialism, another monistic theory, the doctrine that the
physical universe is all that exists. It may be traced back to the early Greeks.
How does this doctrine explain sensations and emotions? In one version it is believed
that these words should be eliminated altogether from the philosopher’s vocabulary, at
least for the purpose of describing facts. In the other version, reductionism, sensations
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and emotions may be explained as complex physical phenomena. That is, the study
of the mind can in principle be reduced to the study of chemistry and physics. They
may either be explained as nothing more that types of behaviour (behaviourism) or as
particular states of neurons in the brain (central-state theory or the identity thesis).
Materialism gains credence from recent progress in understanding the brain (eg.
[Kon93, LeD94]), work which has not found any need for a mind.
Materialism is very much in vogue at the moment following the proclamation by
Francis Crick and Chrostof Koch (the former of double-helix fame) in 1990 that the
time is ripe for science to tackle consciousness (see [Cri94]). This has helped to inspire
“an intellectual stampede” of ‘scientific research’ into consciousness [Hor94].
This doctrine, by definition, precludes consciousness from having a privileged role in
quantum mechanics.
Dualism
Mind-body dualism, or psychoneural dualism, is the doctrine that the mind or con-
sciousness exists as an entity separate to the physical universe. In this model, there is
an objective physical universe and, in addition, associated with humans and perhaps
some other beings is an extra-physical mind which observes (and possibly influences)
the universe. This view may be traced back to Plato although it is Rene Descartes
[Des42] who gave the best known formulation.
Advocates of this view may accept that the behaviour of a fellow human can be
understood without assuming that they have an extra-physical mind. But they feel
that their own sensations must be extra-physical. After all, one could imagine a
human-body obeying the law of physics without having any sensations. The advocate
of dualism believes that he or she must comprise more than ordinary matter and, for
philosophical or emotional reasons, believes that other humans, and perhaps animals,
must be conscious in the same way.
Do the body and mind interact? Descartes thought that they do. The mind observes
the world but also influences it; for example, one makes a conscious decision to move
one’s arm. This is called interactionism.
Others have suggested that the decision to move an arm is made by the physical
brain and the mind can do nothing but observe. This is epiphenomenology. Still
others have suggested that the mind can affect the body but is not affected by it.
This is mentalism. Finally, in a view that goes back to Leibniz, it has been suggested
that the mind and brain do not interact at all but work in parallel maintaining
corresponding states, rather like synchronised clocks. This view is called parallelism
or, more fully, psycho-physical parallelism.
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Neutral monism
There is one more form of monism which warrants a mention, neutral monism. In this
doctrine there is only one type of entity which is neither purely physical nor purely
mental. This doctrine was first proposed by Benedict de Spinoza [Spi77] and various
other forms have been proposed since.
Science and philosophy
Scientists may, for the most part, ignore the multitude of theories of the mind. Their
job is to model the physical world and they have been able to do so, up to know,
without assuming any kind of mind whatsoever. Almost without exception, scien-
tists believe, perhaps implicitly, that their success in modelling the physical world
without reference to the mind, vindicates the idea that the physical world exists in
its own right. In terms of philosophical models, this means that scientists tend to be
materialists or dualists.
Many scientists believe that it is possible to model the physical universe completely
without reference to the mind, ie. they believe that the mind does not affect the
physical world and so reject any form of interactionism or mentalism.
In fact, many scientists are materialists, ie. they reject the existence of anything
outside the physical universe. (In a cynical assessment of this, Wigner [Wig67] writes
“The reason is probably that it as emotional necessity to exalt the problem to which
one wants to devote a lifetime.”.)
In this context, it is easy to see why the present interpretation, which stipulated a
form of interactionism1, is often rejected out of hand.
Criticism
One important difficulty with this interpretation is that it assumes a very specific
model of the mind, a dualistic interactionist model. However, even if this model is
accepted, the interpretation is problematic.
Firstly, it is often criticised for giving predictions which are not clear-cut in that they
depend on which animals are conscious2 and on the precise nature of the measure-
1Contrary to this, von Neumann [Neu55, Ch.VI], who apparently invented the “standard” inter-
pretation, argues that it is consistent with psycho-physical parallelism. But in fact he merely shows
that the effects of the mind making quantum measurements on the brain could not be observed out-
side the body. However, true psycho-physical parallelism demands that these effects be undetectable
even to an observer with perfect access to the brain. It seems that von Neumann used the term par-
allelism not in the strict philosophical sense but rather to describe the phenomenon that in practice
the effects of someone else’s consciousness are not apparent.
2Theories vary from solipsism, the doctrine that only Zvi Schreiber is conscious, to views ascribing
consciousness to all kinds of animals, plants and computers.
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ments performed by the mind. However, this criticism is unscathing as these open
questions could, in principle, be settled by experiment. It is true that even with the
arsenal of modern invasive and non-invasive techniques for observing the brain, the
above experiments will not be feasible for the foreseeable future. But the interpreta-
tion is a good theory in that it has testable consequences and in that it prescribes a
scientific programme for filling in the unspecified parameters.
A more serious criticism is hinted at by Bohm and Hiley [BH93, §2.4]. They write
that “it is difficult to believe that the evolution of the universe before the appearance
of human beings depended fundamentally on the human mind”. This criticism can
be expanded as follows. Assuming that the only minds belong to humans and to
certain animals, the universe in this interpretation would initially undergo no wave
function collapse. If that were true, the universe’s wave function would become
a linear superposition of many different possibilities and human beings or animals
would not come into existence at any well-defined moment. It is therefore difficult to
see at what point minds could start to observe the universe.
Bohm and Hiley write “Of course one could avoid this difficulty by assuming a uni-
versal mind. But if we know little about the human mind, we know a great deal less
about a universal mind. Such an assumption replaces one mystery by an even greater
one.”. Indeed, if the interpretation were correct and if there were minds observing
points outside human and animal brains, we would not know were to start looking
for the quantum effects they must be causing!
Variations
Some have suggested that the mind not only observers the universe causing a random
collapse of the wave function but that rather it chooses between different quantum
alternatives [Mar67, Mar68, Wal74, WH77, Mar84] This is seen as a way of attributing
free will to the mind.
In the normal version of the interpretation, it was shown that the effects of the mind
could be detected by sensitively analysing the brain. But if the mind can actually
choose between alternatives, its effects could be detected outside the body. (Unless
the mind is in some way forced to obey Copenhagen statistics in the long run.)
For example, if Schro¨dinger had many cats each sharing a box with a bomb in the
normal way then when he observed the cats his brain would be in a linear superpo-
sition of seeing them alive and seeing them dead and his mind could choose to make
them all alive thereby causing a blatant deviation from the predictions of quantum
theory. (There have been claims that the mind can be seen to exert just such an
influence on macroscopic objects in the lab [For69]!)
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Conclusion
The interpretation ties down the Copenhagen model by saying that the only true
measuring apparatus are non-physical minds. Unlike the previous two interpretations,
it is ontological and is not inherently ambiguous.
For those who accept the philosophical arguments for dualism and are not scared of a
little interactionism, this interpretation seems attractive. Even so, it does not allow
sensible discussion of the big-bang and evolution.
Scientists must hope for a different interpretation of quantum mechanics.
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Chapter III.4
Hidden variables
I. . . believe. . . that the flight into statistics is to be regarded only as a
temporary expedient that bypasses the fundamentals.
Albert Einstein, [Ein38]
Introduction
The statistical results of quantum mechanics seem at first sight reminiscent of the
non-deterministic results of statistical mechanics. The latter result from underlying
laws which are deterministic. Could the same be true of quantum mechanics? Could
quantum mechanics be incomplete?
The hidden variables programme suggests that in the complete theory, every quantum
system is always in a state in which every observable has a definite value. The
predictions of quantum mechanics reflect the fact that there is no mechanism for
completely observing or controlling every aspect of a system’s state. Ie. there is no
way to prepare an ensemble of systems in which every system has the same position
and the same momentum even though such an ensemble may exist. In fact, the
maximal knowledge we can ever obtain may be summed up by a vector in Hilbert
space. It is precisely for this reason that the specification of the state beyond the
state vector is called hidden.
There exist no hidden variables theories at least in the broad sense described above.
Work on hidden variables has in fact often concentrated on proving that such theories
cannot exist. This chapter therefore does not describe a theory. Instead, it outlines
what would constitute a hidden variables theory and discusses the proofs that no such
theories exist.
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Formulation
The following might be given as the definition of a completion of a quantum mechan-
ical system.
Definition III.4.1 (Completion) Let a quantum mechanical system have states
given by the Hilbert space H and have Hamiltonian Hˆ. A completion of this system
is a tuple (Ω, U, V, µ) where
• Ω is a set (the hidden states)
• for every state s∈Ω and densely define self-adjoint operator1 Qˆ, V (s, Qˆ) is a value
in the spectrum of Qˆ (so in each state each physical quantity has a definite value
— this is often expressed by saying that the states in Ω are ‘dispersion free’)
• for every t > 0, Ut : Ω → Ω is a map which has a measurable inverse (giving the
time evolution over a time interval of length t) where the σ-field of subsets of Ω
generated by the subsets {
s∈Ω | V (s, Qˆ)∈(a1, a2]
}
are called measurable
• for every |ψ〉 ∈ H, µ|ψ〉 is a probability measure on Ω defined on some σ-field
including the sets called measurable above (giving the ratios of systems with different
states in Ω in an ensemble described by |ψ〉)
such that
C.1 the values of observables are consistent with relationships between the ob-
servables
V (s, f(Qˆ)) = f(V (s, Qˆ)) (∀s∈Ω, Qˆ, f :R→ R Borel measurable)
C.2 the ensemble defined by µ|ψ〉 gives Copenhagen statistics:
µ|ψ〉
(
{s∈Ω | V (s, Qˆ)∈B}
)
= Pr
(
Q∈B ; |ψ〉
)
(∀Q,ψ,B Borel)
C.3 the composure of the ensemble associated with a quantum system does not
change with time (although its constituent systems do, of course, evolve with
time)
µe−iHˆt/~|ψ〉(Ut(K)) = µ|ψ〉(K) (∀t>0, ψ,K ⊆ Ω measurable)
1V could be defined only for those operators which belong to physical observables. However, his-
torically it was assumed that all densely defined self-adjoint operators belong to physical observables.
Without this assumption much of the work on impossibility proofs makes little sense.
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C.4 it is consistent to assume that the wave function collapses
µ|ψ〉
(
K ∩ {s∈Ω | V (s, Qˆ)∈B}
)
µ|ψ〉
(
{s∈Ω | V (s, Qˆ)∈B}
) = µPˆ |ψ〉(K) (∀K ⊆ Ω, Q, ψ,B Borel)
where Pˆ projects onto eigenvectors of Qˆ with eigenvalues in B (this represents
the case when Q is measured in an ensemble in state |ψ〉 and the systems with
result in B are selected).
A completion in the above sense would provide a deterministic theory in which all
the predictions of quantum mechanics hold.
In fact, the programme of completing quantum mechanics runs into difficulties long
before the details of ensembles of dispersion free state are considered. The debate
about hidden variables has centred on the feasibility of finding any dispersion free
states s with sensible associated values V (s, Pˆ ). In order to concentrate on this prob-
lem, a dispersion free state may be viewed more abstractly as a map from operators
to R.
Definition III.4.2 (Dispersion free state) A dispersion free state is a map V
from self-adjoint operators to R which maps every observable P to a value in the
spectrum of Pˆ such that
C.1’ the values of observables are consistent with relationships between observables2
V (f(Qˆ)) = f(V (Qˆ)) (∀Qˆ, f :R→ R) .
The trouble is that no such states exist. This is shown under Criticism.
Measurement
It is not immediately apparent whether a hidden variables theory would facilitate the
modelling of measurement within the theory. After all, in the above formulation the
world is still split into system and observer. Whether the observed can be brought
within the system more successfully that in ordinary quantum mechanics is an open
question.
There is, however, room for optimism on this point. In quantum mechanics one could
not describe the whole universe within the formalism because doing so led to the
strange result that nothing ever has a definite state. On the other hand with hidden
variables, the hidden variables may provide this definiteness. Just such an approach
is taken in Bohm’s interpretation, Chapter III.7.
2Again, notice the perhaps unreasonable assumption that V is defined for all densely defined
self-adjoint operators.
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Determinism
A hidden variables theory is completely deterministic. It is of course this which
motivates the programme.
Locality
One of the original motivations of hidden variables theories was to eliminate non-
locality from quantum theory. If the spin in an EPR experiment is determined by
hidden variables, each particle will have a definite z-component of spin all along and
measuring the spin of one merely reveals the spin of the other without influencing it.
However, a famous paper by Bell established that nonlocality is implied not only by
the Hilbert space formalism but by the statistical predictions of quantum mechanics.
Any hidden variables theory which reproduces the statistical predictions of quantum
mechanics would necessarily be nonlocal. A far simpler version of Bell’s argument is
reproduced here from [Mer90c, Mer90a, Mer90b].
Proof of nonlocality
Consider three particles numbered 1, 2 and 3 of spin 1
2
. Write eg. 1x for the x
component of spin of particle 1 and σˆ1x for the associated operator. These satisfy the
commutation relations
[σˆnx, σˆny] = iσˆnz, [σˆny, σˆnz] = iσˆnx, [σˆnz, σˆnx] = iσˆny
with other commutators vanishing.
It is an easy matter to check that the three operators σˆ1xσˆ2yσˆ3y, σˆ1yσˆ2xσˆ3y and
σˆ1yσˆ2yσˆ3x commute. Suppose the particles are in a common eigenstate of these with
each having value 1.
The product of the three operators is −σˆ1xσˆ2xσˆ3x and so the system will also be in
an eigenstate of this operator with eigenvalue 1.
But now assume hidden variables and locality. This means that each particular spin
component has a definite value (which is revealed by the measurement) and that
this value, for a particular particle, cannot depend on which component of spin is
measured for a different particle. Let m1x represent the hidden value of 1x, etc.
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Now in this particular state it must be that m1xm2ym3y=1 etc.
3 Therefore
1 = m21xm
2
2xm
2
3x = (m1xm2ym3y)(m1ym2xm3y)(m1ym2ym3x)(m1xm2xm3x) = −1
giving the required contradiction.
To make the implications clear, suppose that a triplet of particles in the above state
is repeatedly sent out with each particle going in a different direction. Suppose that
at three distant sights sit three observers and each of them on each occasion measures
some component of spin. They later meet and compare results.
Now suppose that the observers assume that on each occasion the m values are well
defined, ie. the result of their experiment was predetermined and depended only on
their own experimental set up, as is the case in hidden variable theories. Looking
back on their data they will all agree that an invariant property of these m values is
that
m1xm2ym3y = m1ym2xm3y = m1ym2ym3x = −m1xm2xm3x = 1
since each of these identities held true in every experiment which happened to test
it. But the observers then find that no six integers satisfy these equations!
The result of each individual experiment cannot be predetermined. If one wants to
insist that the world is deterministic, the only was is to assume that the result of the
three experiments is predetermined only in terms of the experimental apparatus of
all three observers. In other words, the result of one experiment depends nonlocally
on the apparatus set up at the other sights.
In conclusion, from the predictions of quantum mechanics (as opposed to the formal-
ism) it follows that if the world is deterministic it is nonlocal.
Philosophy
It is a little futile to discuss in any detail the philosophy behind a non-existent theory.
Suffice to reword the discussion under Measurement and to say that although one
might initially be looking for an epistemological hidden variables theory, one might
expect such a theory to easily yield an underlying ontological theory.
3To see this, suppose 1x, 2y and 3y were measured giving results m1x, m2y and m3y respectively.
Since σˆ1x, σˆ2y and σˆ3y each commute with σˆ1xσˆ2yσˆ3y , at the end of the measurement the system
is still in an eigenstate of σˆ1xσˆ2yσˆ3y with eigenvalue 1. But now the system is also in an eigenstate
of each of σˆ1x, σˆ2y and σˆ3y with eigenvalues m1x, m2y and m3y respectively and it follows that
m1xm2ym3y =1.
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Criticism
What is proved by impossibility proofs is lack of imagination.
A ‘suspicion’ aired by John S. Bell, [Bel82]
Consider a quantum mechanical system with states given by the Hilbert space H and
with Hamiltonian Hˆ.
Do there exist dispersion free states?
The proof of von Neumann
This theorem is mainly of historical interest. As will be seen, Gleason’s theorem leads
to a much more general result.
Theorem III.4.3 There are no dispersion-free states with the following additional
property.
C.1+ The values of (even non-commutative) operators are additive.
V (Pˆ+Qˆ) = V (Pˆ ) + V (Qˆ) (∀s∈Ω, Pˆ , Qˆ) .

The imposition of C.1+ is dubious. If Pˆ and Qˆ do not commute then measuring P ,
Q and P+Q involves three totally different experiments. P+Q is the sum of P and
Q only in the formal mathematical sense that the operator associated with P+Q is
Pˆ+Qˆ.
Therefore, although it happens to be a fact that
E(Pˆ + Qˆ) = E(Pˆ ) + E(Qˆ)
for the expectation values in quantum mechanics, there is no reason to expect this to
hold for arbitrary states in some completion of quantum mechanics (although it must
hold for quantum ensembles). The postulate described by von Neumann as ‘very
general and plausible’ is ‘absurd’ [Bel82]!
This point may be emphasised by constructing a time-independent completion for
a two-dimensional system, eg. for a particle of spin 1
2
([Bel66, §2], [KS67, §VI]) in
which, of course, C.1+ is violated.
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The proof of Jauch and Piron
The same conclusion is proved by Jauch and Piron [JP63], starting from the following
weaker premises.
C.1+’ If PˆV and PˆW are projections and V (PˆV ) = V (PˆW ) = 1 then V (PˆV ∩W )=1.
It is easy to see that this follows from C.1+.
Bell [Bel66] however argues that the property in C.1+ is once again peculiar to
quantum mechanics and that there is no reason to expect this to hold in some new
theory. It is true that every element in an ensemble with state in V ∩W will have
to have this property. But there may be other hidden states which do not appear in
such ensembles and which violate this property.
Implications of Gleason’s theorem
Theorem III.4.4 Let H be a separable Hilbert space of dimension more than two.
Then there are no dispersion free states for H.
Proof Suppose V were a dispersion free state. Define a map µ from the lattice of
closed linear subspaces of H to R+ by letting µ(U)=V (PˆU ) (in fact µ must take the
values 0 or 1). It will be shown that this map satisfies the conditions of Gleason’s
theorem (Theorem II.1.7).
Let U1, . . . , Un be orthogonal linear subspaces of H. Let
Aˆ =
n∑
i=1
PˆUi = Pˆ
∑
Ui
.
Now Aˆ and the PˆUi all commute so, by a well-known theorem, each is a function of
some common operator Qˆ. C.1’ will therefore imply that
V (Aˆ) = V (Pˆ∑Ui) =∑
i
V (PˆUi) .
Thus, µ(
∑
Ui)=
∑
µ(Ui).
Then Gleason’s theorem implies that there is some density matrix such that
µ(U) = Tr(ρˆPˆU )
for all U . This in turn implies that the state is not dispersion free after all because
there will always be some assertions which are neither true or false (eg. either a
projector tying down position or one tying down momentum). 
Is this the final nail in the coffin of hidden variables? Bell [Bel66] argues that even the
condition C.1’ (Definition III.4.2) is unreasonable and that hidden variables which
do not have property C.1’ are therefore feasible. He writes as follows.
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The result of an observation may reasonably depend not only on the state of the
system (including hidden variables) but also on the complete disposition of the
apparatus.
As an example, suppose Aˆ = f(Pˆ ) and Aˆ = g(Qˆ). Then it so happens that in quantum
mechanics one can measure A by measuring P and applying f or by measuring Q and
applying g. In each case one is obtaining different side information; the first type of
measurement reveals the value of any Bˆ = f ′(Pˆ ) while the second reveals the value of
any Bˆ = g′(Qˆ). However, since in quantum mechanics the statistical predictions for
A are the same in both kind of measurement, one becomes accustomed to thinking of
A as a physical observable and of the two experiments as different ways of measuring
A.
But perhaps deep down there is no physical observable called A and the two exper-
iments are revealing different properties which happen to have the same statistical
distributions in the ensembles allowed by quantum theory!
Thus, the whole definition of completions and dispersion free states has been coloured
by some deep rooted but unfounded assumptions about what constitutes a physical
observable.
So what Gleason’s theorem tells us is that in any hidden variables theory, some
quantities which appeared as coherent physical observables in quantum theory will
manifest themselves as a group of distinct observables, which correspond to different
experimental set ups4. Such observables are called context dependent observables
although this slightly obscures the point that they are not really observables. As Bell
[Bel82] points out, all of this is in accord with Bohr’s philosophy that the properties
of a system are inextricably tied up with the set-up of the experiment.
So it turns out that the proofs against hidden variables are disappointing. They only
tell us that some quantities which seem like observables in quantum mechanics will
turn out to depend on the experimental set up in a hidden variables theory. And
this is not new! Bell’s theorem has already established that some results will have
to depend on the experimental set up, in fact, on the experimental set up at remote
sights!
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Chapter III.5
Many-worlds interpretation
Every quantum transition taking place on every star, in every galaxy, in
every remote corner of the universe is splitting our local world on earth into
myriads of copies of itself.
B. S. DeWitt, [DeW71]
Introduction
At the heart of the measurement problem is the contrast between the coherent state
(III.1.2):
(|“up”〉| ↑〉+ |“down”〉| ↓〉)/
√
2 .
predicted by Schro¨dinger’s equation, on the one hand, and the two possible outcomes
(III.1.1):
|“up”〉| ↑〉 or |“down”〉| ↓〉
predicted by the wave function collapse, on the other.
The many-worlds interpretation suggests that these are one and the same!
If it were possible to imagine that the two summands |“up”〉| ↑〉 and |“down”〉| ↓〉
represents equally real but separate realities then the wave function collapse would
actually follow from the Schro¨dinger equation!
In the many-worlds interpretation, this is achieved by the bold suggestion that the
summands in the coherent state represent separate worlds, existing in parallel and
equally real, one in state |“up”〉| ↑〉 and the other in state |“down”〉| ↓〉.
The idea of decomposing the state into orthogonal summands to show that the uni-
tary mechanics and wave function collapse are one and the same is highly seductive.
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Here, an extreme view will be taken: this observation is entirely irrelevant to the
interpretation of quantum mechanics.
Why? The measurement problem arises because in studying our world it is found that
both the Schro¨dinger equation and wave function collapse are needed. The challenge
is therefore to find a way to understand both the Schro¨dinger equation and the wave
function collapse within our world. There is no virtue in finding a way to apply the
Schro¨dinger equation elsewhere, ie. in some collection of worlds.
The many-worlds interpretation has always been presented in a vague way along with
exaggerated claims (such as “The mathematical formalism of the quantum theory is
capable of yielding its own interpretation” [DeW71]) and overlooked technical prob-
lems. Nonetheless, it has received broad attention and is therefore considered here.
Formulation
Rules
The universe may be associated with a separable Hilbert space H; a densely defined
self-adjoint operator Hˆ on H called the Hamiltonian; and an element |ψ〉∈H called
the initial state, in such a way that the following hold.
• At any time, the universe comprises a countable number of worlds each of which
has a space-time like our own world and each of which may be described by a state
in H. The worlds have a branching structure1, ie. sometimes one world splits into
countably many worlds.
• Parallel worlds at one time have orthogonal states.
• The total state of any subset of the branches evolves according to Schro¨dinger’s
equation with Hamiltonian Hˆ.
• If one assigns a measure 〈ψ|ψ〉 to a world in state |ψ〉 (the previous rule implies that
this measure is conserved across a split) then one should only expect to reproduce
the predictions of quantum mechanics in almost all worlds (with respect to this
measure).
• The way in which vectors in H describe the world is understood using orthodox
quantum mechanics, ie. self-adjoint operators and the like.
The ontology is sketched in Figure III.5.1.
1Formally, one might say that there are countably many branches bi(t) ∈H. Then for any two
branches bi and bj , tij could give the time at which these two branches split from each other.
One would then impose that tik cannot precede both tij and tjk (a form of transitivity) and that
bi(t)=bj(t) for t≤ tij.
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Figure III.5.1: The many-worlds ontology
Discussion
At any one time the states of parallel worlds are orthogonal so these states may be
normalised and extended (perhaps in many ways) to a complete orthonormal set of
vectors. Such a set is called a preferred basis.
Conversely, given that |ψ1〉, |ψ2〉, . . . is a preferred basis at some time, the global state
may be decomposed into the form
∑
i ai|ψi〉 giving the states of the different worlds
at that time: a1|ψ1〉, a2|ψ2〉, . . . (ignoring zeroes).
The interpretation is still incomplete in that it does not give details of the branching
structure or of the preferred basis and its time evolution.
It is necessary to check that the rules can be satisfied. Suppose that an arbitrary
branching structure is fixed. At any time when no splitting occurs, the state of
each world must evolve according to the Schro¨dinger equation. (This means that
the elements of the ‘preferred basis’ are also evolving according to the Schro¨dinger
equation. One cannot have a fixed preferred basis.)
What happens at a split? Of course, the total state must not change discontinuously.
What happens is that a world in state |ψ〉 splits into worlds with orthogonal states
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|φ1〉, |φ2〉,. . . , where |ψ〉 =
∑
i |φi〉. (This corresponds to a discontinuous change in
the preferred basis.)
This is sufficient to ensure that all the rules are satisfied.
Achievements
What has been achieved? Consider one branch. At times the state of that branch
evolves in accordance with the Schro¨dinger equation. At other times (at the splits)
it undergoes a wave function collapse.
This, of course, is a possible way to solve the measurement problem. The world obeys
the Schro¨dinger equation except that the wave function sometimes collapses ensuring
that things have some sort of definite state. Of course, the big question is when and
how this collapse occurs and the many-worlds interpretation has left this completely
open.
So what has been gained by assuming many-worlds? Merely that it might be possible
for the entire collection of worlds to be described by Schro¨dinger’s equation. This, as
already argued, is no gain at all.
Measurement
There is one thing that works in the many-worlds interpretation, namely that the
Copenhagen statistics for a measurement are reproduced. This does assume that
things have been sorted out so that the preferred basis at the end of the measurement
is precisely a basis consisting of the eigenstates of the system and apparatus (tensor
producted with some states for the rest of the world). (Of course, the central difficulty
with this type of interpretation is how to sort things out so that this always holds.
This in turn requires a rigorous definition of a measurement.)
Consider a system with normalised eigenstates |χ1〉, |χ2〉, . . . coupled with an observer
in initial normalised state |φ〉 in such a way that over a specified time the initial state
|φ〉 ⊗ |χi〉 evolves into the normalised state |φi〉 ⊗ |χi〉 in which the observer has
completed the measurement and has a record of the result.
Let |R〉 be the state of the rest of the world and assume that |R〉 ⊗ |φi〉 ⊗ |χi〉 is a
part of a preferred basis at this time.
What is the result of performing a measurement on the normalised state
∑
i ai|χi〉 ?
Of course, the state |R〉 ⊗ |φ〉 ⊗∑i ai|χi〉 evolves to the state |R〉 ⊗∑i ai(|φi〉 ⊗ |χi〉)
in which there are a number of worlds in each of which a specific value has been
measured.
In the world where the observer measured value i (that is where the observer is in
state |φi〉), the state of the system is |χi〉 after the measurement, ie. each observer
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observes the wave function collapse predicted in the Copenhagen interpretation.
To check that the Copenhagen statistics are observed, it is necessary to consider the
same experiment on an ensemble.
Consider an ensemble of n copies of the system and a team of n observers with states
|φ〉 = |φ〉 · · · |φ〉 |φi1,...,in〉 = |φi1〉 · · · |φin〉 .
Then the initial state
|R〉 ⊗ |φ〉 ⊗
[(∑
i
ai|χi〉
)
⊗ · · · ⊗
(∑
i
ai|χi〉
)]
evolves into the state
|R〉 ⊗
∑
i1,...,in
ai1 · · · ain |φi1,...,in〉 ⊗ |χi1〉 ⊗ · · · ⊗ |χin〉 .
It must now be assumed that each of these summands is in a preferred basis.
The measure of the observer who observes the sequence i1, . . . , in is |a1|2 · · · |an|2. It
follows that as n→∞, the measure of observers who observe the proportion of results
i to be within ǫ of |ai|2 tends to one2. In the limit, almost all observers obtain the
probabilities predicted by the Copenhagen interpretation.
Note that it is also easy to check that almost all observers will obtain the results
predicted by Schro¨dinger’s equation if they wait before performing the measurement.
Determinism
The interpretation is deterministic. This does not, however, allow definite predictions
to be made because a typical prediction will be wrong in most futures.
Locality
In the many-world interpretation an experiment performed at one point in the uni-
verse causes a split at all points in the universe. In this sense, the interpretation
cannot be considered local.
2Note that the measure of the observer who observes the sequence i1, . . . , in is |a1|2 · · · |an|2 which
is precisely equal to the probability that a sequence of n integers in which each given integer equals
i with probability |ai|2 is in fact i1, . . . , in.
Now as n → ∞, the probability that the proportion of entries in such a sequence with value i is
within ǫ of |ai|2 (for any ǫ>0) tends to one. The result follows.
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Philosophy
The interpretation presents a bizarre realistic ontology.
Criticism
The central difficulty with the many-worlds interpretation is that it is formulated so
vaguely as to hardly warrant the title interpretation. With no indication of how to
sort out the preferred basis and branching structure, the interpretation has achieved
nothing.
The other disturbing feature of this interpretation is the ontological extravagance of an
infinity of parallel worlds. (These are intended to recover the Schro¨dinger equation.)
Another criticism of the interpretation which is sometimes raised (eg. [Alb92, p.115])
is what sense can be made, in the interpretation, of the statement that an event will
happen with probability p? However, sense can be made of this by saying that (in
almost all futures) if the experiment is repeated many times then the given result will
occur with frequency p.
Variations
Some people try to avoid the extravagance of many-worlds by talking about one world
with many stories (eg. [Loc89]). However, it is not at all clear what this really means.
It is possible to avoid the extra worlds by assuming that only one survives. Explicitly,
one may assume that whenever the world branches, only one world is retained, it being
chosen probabilistically with probability proportional to the branch’s measure in the
ordinary many-worlds interpretation. This has been called the one-world version of
the many-worlds interpretation [Hea84]. It is the version which Bell considered most
defensible. It is, of course, not a theory with many-worlds although there are still
many possible future worlds of which one will be realised.
It seems that in the many-worlds interpretation one can choose between a deter-
ministic universe with many worlds and a stochasticly governed universe with one
world.
Conclusion
The many-worlds interpretation makes no progress in helping us to understand the
wave function collapse. It introduces extra worlds to allow Schro¨dinger’s equation to
be recovered but this is pointless.
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Chapter III.6
Many-minds interpretation
We have little doubt that the MMV (many-minds view)
will invoke in most readers an “incredulous stare”.
David Albert and BarryLoewer [AL89]
Introduction
The many-minds interpretation accepts Everett’s idea that all results of an experiment
are equally real but shies away from the idea that this involves making an infinite
number of copies of the universe. Instead, different minds perceive the different
results.
Formulation
Rules
The universe may be associated with a separable Hilbert space H; a densely defined
self-adjoint operator Hˆ on H called the Hamiltonian; and an element |ψ〉∈H called
the initial state, in such a way that the following hold.
• The state of the universe may be represented by a vector in Hilbert space which
evolves according to Schro¨dinger’s equation with Hamiltonian Hˆ.
• Each conscious brain in the universe is associated with many non-physical minds.
There is a specific set of normalised orthogonal states of a brain written |B1〉, |B2〉, . . .
for each of which the attached mind is in a given state, ie. these brain states cor-
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respond to particular sensations. (States of the mind may therefore be labelled
B1, B2, . . . .)
• Suppose the universe is in state ∑ |Bi〉|Ri〉 where the |Ri〉 are normalised states
of the rest of the world. Suppose that |Bi〉|Ri〉 evolves over time to the state∑
j bj|Bj〉|R′j〉 with the |R′j〉 normalised. Then the probability that any one mind
initially in state Bi ends up in state Bj is |bj |2.
There is an immediate difficulty with this formulation, similar to the vagueness re-
garding the branching structure in the many-worlds interpretation.
In order to decide the probability for a particular mind to be in a particular state Bi
at time t, one may look at its state at some earlier time and the above rule will give
the probability. But for each earlier time there will be such a probability! In general
these probabilities will all be different.
Of course, it is always possible that with a large enough set of minds the allocation
could be done very cleverly so that all the rules of probabilities are satisfied. It is
just that nobody has ever been clever enough to propose such a scheme1.
Measurement
In this interpretation, a measurement occurs when a conscious brain becomes aware
of the result. For example, let Aˆ be an observable on some system with spectrum
|A1〉, |A2〉, . . . and let |“Ai”〉 (equal to some |Bj〉) represent the state of a brain which
has noted the value of A to be i.
A measurement consists of a chain of interactions under which any state |?〉|Ai〉 evolves
into the state |“Ai”〉|Ai〉.
To see that the orthodox statistics are reproduced, let a system be in state |Ai〉.
Someone measures the state leading to a state |“Ai”〉|Ai〉. Now suppose the two sys-
tems evolve independently for a time into state |?〉(∑i ai|Ai〉). Another measurement
changes this into state
∑
i ai|“Ai”〉|Ai〉. Of the minds which originally perceived “Ai”
the rules dictate that a proportion |aj|2 now perceive “Aj” in accordance with the
orthodox statistics.
Determinism
The state of the universe evolves deterministically but the state of a given mind
evolves probabilistically.
1Albert [Alb92, p.130] has suggested that in the state
∑
j
bj |Bj〉|Rj〉, the proportion of minds
in state Bi is bi. Far from making a start at solving the above problem, this statement actually
contradicts the probability rule above as a bit of algebra shows.
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Locality
The inventors of the interpretation claim that it is local. In the EPR situation, when
each observer measures the z-component of spin, half of their minds perceive it to be
up and the other half of their minds perceive it to be down. It makes no difference
in what order the experiments are performed. (Even so, if both observers write down
the result then all minds will perceive the results to be anti-correlated.)
More generally, it is easy to check that the probabilistic evolution of the state of a
mind does not depend on what happens in a part of the universe which is isolated
from the associated brain or on what happens to a mind attached to a distant brain.
Nevertheless, there is a sense in which the interpretation is not local. Considering
again the EPR situation, when a particular mind becomes committed to seeing the
local particle’s z-component of spin as being up or down, it is also being committed
to seeing the distant particle’s z component as being, respectively, down or up. So, as
in orthodox quantum mechanics, the local experiment causes the distant particle to
take on a definite z-component of spin, at least as far as the local mind is concerned
(even though the distant minds will be unaffected).
This ambiguity in the understanding of locality is due to the fact that the interpre-
tation is mainly concerned with describing minds (ie. it is idealistic, see Philosophy
below). As such, it is not terribly clear that the concept of locality is even relevant.
Philosophy
The interpretation is most easily understood as being idealistic. In other words,
it assumes that no universe exists independently of minds and that Schro¨dinger’s
equation may be used to predict the time evolution of minds. There may be many
conscious entities each associated with infinitely many minds and their sensations are
governed by a single equation so are correlated.
Criticism
It is not clear that the probability rule can be satisfied. If it can, this interpretation
suffers from the same difficulty as the interpretation in which the mind causes collapse;
it cannot explain the evolution of the universe prior to the appearance of (animals
and) man.
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Variations
The interpretation was originally formulated in terms of sets of minds so that to
any one mind attached to one person’s brain their corresponded a particular mind
attached to another person’s brain [AL89]. The idea was that, for example, in an
EPR type situation it is this pair of minds which would be anti-correlated in their
perceptions. If they ever met they could confirm this. But since minds cannot meet,
this idea seems a bit pointless and indeed it was dropped [Alb92].
Conclusion
The fact that this interpretation is extremely bizarre would be more palletable if the
technical stuff actually worked.
Bibliography
The interpretation is presented in [AL88, Alb88, AL89] and [Alb92, esp. pp.130–133].
Chapter III.7
Bohm’s interpretation
The God of the BB (Bohm-Bell) view doesn’t play dice
but he has a malicious sense of humor.
David Albert and Barry Loewer, [AL89]
Introduction
Bohm’s interpretation of quantum mechanics came about not so much as an attempt
to solve the measurement problem but more as an attempt to explain the wave-
particle duality. In quantummechanics electrons, for example, display the interference
properties of waves while, at the same time, coming in discrete multiples of some basic
mass like particles.
In 1927 de Broglie [Bro27] suggested that the duality could be resolved by saying that
an electron was a wave and a particle, ie. the wave function represents a physical field
and in it moves a particle with well defined position and momentum. This theory
was retracted in 1930 [Bro30].
The idea was taken up (independently) by Bohm in 1952 [Boh52]. Here it was cast as
a hidden variables theory in which the position of the particle is the hidden variable.
Later Bohm stopped using the term ‘hidden variables’ and emphasised the fact that
his interpretation promotes quantum mechanics from epistemology to ontology.
Here, the interpretation is first presented as a hidden variables theory. Its application
to closed systems is then discussed.
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Formulation
As a hidden variables theory
Bohm’s interpretation gets around the impossibility proofs with the following bold
conjecture: the only true observable is position.
The interpretation may be formulated for a spinless system with n generalised coor-
dinates as follows.
Rules
The system may be associated with a self-adjoint Hamiltonian Hˆ densely defined on
L2(Rn), with a wave function ψ(t, q1, . . . , qn) (which may be seen as an objective
physical field) and with n sharply defined coordinates following continuous paths
r1(t), . . . , rn(t), in such a way that the following hold.
• The wave function evolves according to Schro¨dinger’s equation with Hamiltonian
Hˆ.
• The rate of change r˙i(t) of the ith coordinate at time t is equal to
r˙i(t) =
ji(t, r1(t), . . . , rn(t))
|ψ(t, r1(t), . . . , rn(t))|2(III.7.1)
where j is the (n-dimensional) probability density current for the wave function ψ.
• A measurement which tests in which of a number of (Borel) sets Bi the jth coordi-
nate lies at time t will yield the set Bk containing rj(t). It will also cause the wave
function to collapse in such a way that ψ(t, q1, . . . , qn) will be zero for qj 6∈ Bk.
• In any ensemble of systems with wave function ψ, the number of systems with
coordinates in the Borel set B is proportional to
∫
B |ψ(r)|2dr .
Discussion
The idea is that the sharp coordinates ri(t) are hidden variables determining the result
of any measurement of a coordinate. A quantum mechanical ensemble with wave
function ψ really consists of systems all of which have wave function ψ and in which
the proportion of systems with coordinate values r1, . . . , rn at time t is proportional
to |ψ(t, r1, . . . , rn)|2. If this is true at time t, the definition of the probability density
current ensures that it stays true at all later times.
It is possible to check that this is a completion of quantum mechanics in the formal
sense of Definition III.4.1 if “every self-adjoint operator Qˆ” is replaced in the definition
by “each of the operators qˆ1, . . . , qˆn”. The set of states Ω = L
2(Rn) × Rn; a typical
CHAPTER III.7. BOHM’S INTERPRETATION 75
state may be written (ψ, r) (strictly one should call ψ and kψ equivalent and consider
equivalence classes). Q((ψ, r), qˆi) is of course just ri. The time evolution Ut evolves
the wave function according to Schro¨dinger’s equation and the coordinates according
to (III.7.1).
For every Borel set B ⊆ Rn, one may define µψ({φ} ×B) = δψφ
∫
B |ψ(x)|2 dx.
It may be checked that C.1–C.4 hold.
For closed systems
The same formalism precisely may be applied to closed systems, in particular to the
entire universe. Again, the n-dimensional spinless case is considered.
Rules
The closed system may be associated with a self-adjoint Hamiltonian Hˆ densely de-
fined on L2(Rn), with a wave function ψ(t, q1, . . . , qn) (which may be seen as an
objective physical field) and with n sharply defined coordinates following continuous
paths r1(t), . . . , rn(t), in such a way that the following hold.
• The wave function evolves according to Schro¨dinger’s equation with Hamiltonian
Hˆ.
• The rate of change r˙i(t) of the ith coordinate at time t is equal to
r˙i(t) =
ji(t, r1(t), . . . , rn(t))
|ψ(t, r1(t), . . . , rn(t))|2
where j is the (n-dimensional) probability density current for the wave function ψ.
• Human experience results from a perception of the “hidden” coordinates (not from
a perception of the wave function).
Discussion
It is now necessary to establish that the two presentations are mutually consistent.
One must show that in a closed system one may treat any subsystem (which does not
contain conscious entities) using the hidden variables formulation.
Suppose the subsystem comprises coordinate 1, . . . ,m. Then the wave function of
this subsystem may be obtained from the total wave function by
ψ0(t, r1, . . . , rm) =
∫
R
ψ(t, r1, . . . , rn)drm+1 · · · drn .(III.7.2)
The hidden coordinates of the subsystem are r1(t), . . . , rm(t) as in the total system.
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The fact that an ensemble of such subsystems will tend to have a |ψ|2 distribution is
proved in [Val91a]. Note that once this distribution is obtained it will be maintained
(this follows from the definition of j).
When there is no interaction, the wave function and the coordinates will have the
correct time evolution. When a measurement of position takes place, this must be
modelled in the total system and it must be shown that the interaction preduces
the result predetermined by the r1(t), . . . , rm(t) and that it causes the reduced wave
function (III.7.2) to collapse. This will be shown under Measurement.
When Bohm’s interpretation is applied to the whole universe, the particle coordi-
nates, far from being hidden, are the only things which we perceive. This important
assumption is sometimes swept under the carpet in discussions of Bohm’s interpre-
tation. But if our perceptions are determined by the wave function, the coordinates
would play no role whatsoever. Note, however, that when considering a subset of the
universe which includes no conscious brain, the particle coordinate are hidden.
Comparison with many-worlds interpretation
The many-worlds interpretation seeks to explain the definite position of macroscopic
objects by writing the wave function as a sum of different vectors and saying that
different vectors are experienced in different branches of the universe. Bohm’s inter-
pretation achieves the same thing using the “hidden” coordinates and it is instructive
to cast this in the language of many worlds.
Let ψ(t,x1,x2, . . . ) be the wave function of the universe. At time t, this may be
written as the sum
ψ(t,x1,x2, . . . ) =
∫
ψ(t, r1, r2, . . . )δ(x1−r1)δ(x2−r2) · · · dr1 dr2 · · · .
This may be interpreted as a continuum of universes. A typical world has wave
function δ(x1−r1)δ(x2−r2) · · · and measure |ψ(t, r1, r2, . . . )|2. In each world every
particle has a definite position.
A branch may be said to have the defining property that every particle moves con-
tinuously in that branch.
Now the “hidden” coordinates of Bohm’s interpretation clearly define a branch in this
many-worlds model. These are a very special class of branches in which the laws of
quantum mechanics are observed to hold.
Clearly, Bohm’s interpretation is not a many-worlds theory. In the first place, the
above account uses uncountably many worlds. It has not been shown how to write the
wave function in terms of the branches. And, most importantly, only a very special
class of branches is picked out.
Nevertheless, it is interesting to see the relationship between these seemingly unrelated
interpretations.
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Spin
There has been an attempt to model spin in Bohm’s interpretation as the physical
spin of the particle [BST55]. However this fails where there is more than one particle.
Instead, spin should be considered as a property of the wave function only. It is then
only necessary to recast (III.7.1) in terms of the spinor wave function and this can be
done in two ways (compare [Bel84] and [BH93, §10.4–10.5]).
Measurement
Of position
The aim now must be to recover the hidden variables version of the theory from the
theory for closed systems. In other words, if the measured particle and measured
apparatus are all modelled within the theory, one must derive the result that the
measured position will correspond to the coordinates of the measured particles and
that wave function will appear to collapse.
Consider a simple impulsive measurement of position in which a macroscopic pointer
initially has wave function ψini and after the measurement has position y correspond-
ing to the measured position of the particle. This is only intended as an example and
so the mathematically dubious Dirac delta functions will be used here.
During the measurement, an initial wave function δ(x− r)ψini(y) corresponding to a
particle in position r evolves into the wave function δ(x − r)δ(y − r) in which both
the particle and pointer have position r. In this case the hidden coordinate of the
particle must initially be r and both hidden coordinates end up as r.
If, more generally, the particle initially has wave function
ψ(x)ψini(y) =
∫
ψ(r)δ(x − r)ψini(y) dr
then, by linearity, it evolves into the wave function∫
ψ(r)δ(x − r)δ(y − r) dr = ψ(x)δ(y − x)(III.7.3)
in which the coordinate x and y are perfectly correlated.
What about the hidden coordinates? If the initial coordinate was q for the particle
then in the sharp case of an initial wave function δ(x−q)ψini(y) the coordinates end up
as q for both the particle and pointer. Here we have a superposition of wave packets∫
ψ(r)δ(x−r)δ(y) dr but the wave packets never overlap (because of the δ(x−r) factor
which does not change with time) so just one of them affects the hidden coordinates
and therefore the coordinates vary in exactly the same way ending up as q for both
the position and particle.
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Thus the hidden variables result is recovered. The final coordinate of the pointer,
which is perceived by us, corresponds accurately to the hidden coordinate of the
particle.
What about wave function collapse? In any further experiments on the particle,
the perceived results will again be based entirely on the “hidden” coordinate of the
pointer. This coordinate will evolve according to the probability density current of
the wave function (III.7.3). But here again, the packets do not overlap and only the
packet δ(x − q)δ(y − q) will contribute to the behaviour of the pointer coordinate.
This shows that for the purposes of predicting further results the wave function of
the particle must be taken to be the collapsed form δ(x − q).
Of other observables
Measurements of other observables will not lead to definite answers.
Consider what happens if the above argument is repeated for momentum. An initial
wave function eipx/~ψini(y) evolves into e
ipxeipy. The more general wave function∫
φ(k)eikxψinidk
evolves, by linearity, into ∫
φ(k)eikxeikydk .(III.7.4)
But here all the wave packets will affect the hidden coordinates, (not just the one
with momentum equal to the initial momentum of the coordinate, for example). So
the hidden coordinates will not predetermine the result. In fact, no definite result
will emerge since the momentum of the hidden coordinates will not settle down to a
fixed value.
In doing further calculations, all the wave packets in (III.7.4) will influence the hidden
coordinates and no wave function collapse will be observed.
In conclusion, there is no measurement until there is a measurement of position.
Determinism
The theory is deterministic.
Locality
The theory is explicitly nonlocal. The velocity (III.7.1) of a particle depends on the
multidimensional wave function at the point given by all the other particles. Therefore
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any change in the position of one particle instantly changes the velocity of the other
particles.
It is reassuring, however, that if the wave function is separable (ie. if two systems
have not interacted in the past) then the systems do not interact nonlocally. This is
easily checked.
In any event, the nonlocal effect on a distant system may effect that system but will
not have a perceptible effect on a |ψ|2 ensemble of such systems since such an ensemble
obeys the rules of quantum mechanics. This makes nonlocal communication rather
difficult.
Even so, there is currently no proof that nonlocal communication is impossible in
Bohm’s interpretation because there may be situations in which there is no |ψ|2
ensemble. (This necessarily entails signal nonlocality [Val91b].)
Philosophy
The theory gives a realistic ontological model of the universe.
It gives a special role to position. The term positionism was coined in [AL89] for this
philosophy!
The particles in the theory are influenced by the wave but do not influence it (epiphe-
nomenalism) a position which offends some people’s sense of justice.
Criticism
Nonlocality has often been sighted as the interpretations least attractive feature.
There are other difficulties too.
The privileged role of position
The interpretation gives position a unique role which it does not obviously deserve.
It is true that most experiments on quantum system go through a stage of record-
ing positions eg. in a photographic plate or bubble or spark chamber. But is this
necessarily the case or is it just convenient in practice?
It is also no use having a measurement of position somewhere along the line — the final
measurement must be of position. This really means that the information presented
by the brain to the mind (be that a component of the brain or a separate entity) had
better be presented using position. Otherwise, humans would not perceive the world
in a definite state.
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This important implication of Bohm’s theory has not been made clear up to know.
Indeed one of the main attractions of the theory has been its apparent independence
from any considerations of the mind.
The mysterious quantum potential
Consider a particle moving through space in Bohm’s interpretation with a wave func-
tion ψ. It may be checked that the fact that its velocity is given by (III.7.1) implies
that the particle is subject to a potential
− ~
2
2m
∇2|ψ|
|ψ| .
Bohm himself felt that this potential is “rather strange and arbitrary” and “has no
visible source”. At that time Bohm accepted this as grounds for being dissatisfied
with the interpretation.
Later, however, Bohm and Hiley [BH93, p.37] suggested that the wave function should
not be seen as a potential pushing the particle around. Instead, the wave function
acts like a map (they call this active information) guiding the particle which reads
the wave function and then adjusts its own speed.
They write: “The fact that the particle is moving under its own energy, but being
guided by the information in the quantum field, suggests that an electron or any
other elementary particle has a complex and subtle inner structure (eg. perhaps even
comparable to that of a radio).”
This suggestion seems strange. There are many ways to reassemble the parts of a
radio and obtain something else. There is no evidence that the same may be done
with an electron.
However, this problem and the awkward solution proposed by Bohm and Hiley only
come about from trying to cast the interpretation in the familiar language of po-
tentials. But here a new and fundamental theory of the universe is being proposed
and there is no reason to expect it to conform to this model. Instead, the formula
(III.7.1) for velocity, which seems neither strange nor arbitrary, may be taken as a
new fundamental law of physics.
Variations
In one variation it is assumed that there are sub-quantum fluctuations. These ensure
that every ensemble rapidly reaches a |ψ|2 distribution [BV54, Nel66, BH89].
Bohm’s interpretation does not extend naturally to quantum field theories because
such theories lack a position observable. However, versions of the interpretation do
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exist for the electromagnetic field [Boh52, Appendix], the Fermi field [Bel84] and for
Boson fields [BH93, Ch.11].
Conclusion
Bibliography
The idea of the wave function guiding a particle was originally presented in [Bro27]
for a one-body system. In this presentation it was suggested that a non-linear mod-
ification of the Schro¨dinger equation might give rise to a stable singularity or pulse
(corresponding to Bohm’s particle) with values elsewhere agreeing with the ordinary
wave function. This idea was called double solution. This was criticised at the 1927
Solvay congress particularly by Pauli [Pau28]. The most important criticism was that
the theory did not explain two-particle experiments. Indeed, the double solution has
never been extended to many particles.
The social reasons for the theory’s rejection are discussed in [Pin77, Cus94]. The
theory was retracted [Bro30].
The theory was again and independently proposed, in great detail, by Bohm [Boh52].
Bohm encouraged de Broglie to take it up again [Bro56a, Bro56b]. Interestingly,
Einstein found the theory “too cheap” [Bor71]1 although, as Born put it, “it was quite
in line with his own ideas”.
De Broglie himself did not like it very much [Bro70]. (These comments were collected
by Bell [Bel82].)
Bohm [Boh80] accepted that the form of the quantum potential is “rather strange
and arbitrary” and “has no visible source” but later Bohm and Hiley [BH93, p.37]
devised the concept of active information to help explain the potential.
Other references including a discussion of Bohm’s interpretation include [Bel71, Bel76,
Bel81, Bel82, AL89, Bel90] [Alb92, Ch.7]. A less technical discussion is [Alb94].
Examples of how Bohm’s interpretation works in different cases include [DH82, DKV84,
Dew85, DHK86, DHK87, VDHK87, DL90, DM93], [BH93, Ch.5].
The proof that any ensemble tends to a |ψ|2 distribution was presented in [BV54,
BH89], by assuming the existence of subquantum fluctuations. It was proved in
[Val91a] for the original Bohm theory.
[Val91b] proves that the theory exhibits signal-locality iff the ensemble has |ψ|2 dis-
tribution. The uncertainty principle is also shown to be peculiar to this case.
1See page 192 and letters 81,84,86,88,97,99,103,106,108,110,115,116.
Chapter III.8
Decoherent histories (Ontology)
Introduction
A consistent set of histories (Chapter II.2) gives a whole experimental plan which
may be carried out on a quantum system without disturbing the system (at least in
the sense that later results will be unaffected by the fact that earlier experiments took
place).
Thinking purely in the orthodox interpretation, consider a quantum system and a
set of histories consistent with respect to the system’s Hamiltonian and initial state.
Left to its own devices, the quantum system will evolve into a state in which nothing
has a definite value.
Now one could actually carry out the experiments in the set of histories. This would
ensure that various useful observables do take on definite values. And, most impor-
tantly, this would be achieved without in anyway disturbing the predictions of the
Schro¨dinger equation. (It should be emphasised that the predictions are not dis-
turbed in the sense that these predictions may be checked against the available data,
whether in their fine-grained form or in any coarse-graining. Of course, these are the
only ways in which the predictions can be checked so this statement is quite strong.)
How is this relevant to interpretation? If the Schro¨dinger equation is applied to the
whole universe, one could understand why observables take definite values simply by
assuming that a set of external experiments is being performed on the universe. At
first this seems no different to the idea that the mind, for example, is performing
experiments on the universe. However, the big difference is that, assuming the set of
histories is consistent, in this model the predictions of the Schro¨dinger equation are
perfectly valid while effects of the mind would lead to violation of the Schro¨dinger
equation in the brain.
The usefulness of this idea depends, of course, on there existing useful consistent sets
of histories. In fact, sets of histories involving macroscopic observables (such as the
approximate position or momentum of a large object) do tend to be consistent as a
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result of the phenomenon of decoherence (see bibliography).
This idea leads in an obvious way to an ontological view of a universe which is
experimented on in accordance with a consistent set of histories causing random
wave-function collapse, and which, between experiments, evolves in accordance with
Schro¨dinger’s equation. Below, this is slightly abstracted. The interpretation is for-
mulated in terms of the results of the experiment and the quantum state is done away
with.
It should however be noted immediately that there is a more subtle approach. If the
experimental programme defined by a consistent set of histories does not interfere
with a quantum system (in some sense), perhaps it is not necessary to perform the
experiments at all. Perhaps it is not necessary to think about a quantum state at all.
Perhaps it is possible to talk about the system’s properties directly by talking about
the histories, their logical relations and their probabilities. This abstract idea does
not lead to an ontological model but does lead to a powerful epistemology in which
one can make predictions and retrodictions. This approach is discussed in the next
chapter.
Formulation
Rules
• The universe may be associated with a separable Hilbert space H; an initial state
consisting of a density matrix ρˆ on H; a Hamiltonian consisting of a densely defined
self-adjoint operator Hˆ on H; and a set of histories S over H consistent with respect
to ρˆ and Hˆ;
• facts about the macroscopic world may be associated with projectors on H
in such a way that the following hold.
• The projectors associated with the same fact at different times are related by the
Heisenberg equation.
• The history of the universe is non-deterministic and corresponds to some history
in S with probability given by the standard histories formalism.
Achievements
Note that in this formulation it is assumed that it is possible to construct a consistent
set of histories in which every possible fact which humans might directly perceive
appears as a projector. In particular, the approximate positions and momenta of
macroscopic objects would appear at very frequent intervals in this set of histories.
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Assuming that this is possible, this interpretation represents an impressive success.
On the one hand, in this interpretation Schro¨dinger’s equation applies perfectly in
the sense that the relationship between any two facts that humans can perceive will
be perfectly (probabilistically) explained by Schro¨dinger’s equation. This equation
may also be used for prediction.
On the other hand, the definite state of the world around us is also explained.
Relationship with orthodox interpretation
This interpretation has a strange relationship with orthodox quantum mechanics.
Firstly, in order to complete the interpretation into a theory of quantum cosmology
one needs to find ρˆ, Hˆ and to find a way of associating projectors with macroscopic
facts. Only orthodox quantum mechanics can guide this programme.
Further, in this interpretation one must rely on orthodox quantum mechanics in order
to reconstruct our physical intuition. How so? The interpretation does not give any
meaning to the existence of microscopic particles. Of course, it does predict the effects
of these particles, ie. the appearance of tracks in bubble chambers1. But if one wants
to talk about these particles, one must, in practice, use orthodox quantum mechanics
to read the existence of microscopic particles into the Hamiltonian H.
In other words, orthodox quantum mechanics may be derived from the interpretation.
Choice of S
Physicists have some ideas about choosing Hˆ (in terms of the four forces of nature)
and ρˆ. Is there a natural choice of S?
Essentially this point has been discussed at length in the work of Gell-Mann and Har-
tle and in the secondary literature. They suggest looking for the set of histories which
is most quasiclassical or for one of the sets of histories which is most quasiclassical,
in some sense to be made precise. The idea is that a quasiclassical ‘domain’ should
be a consistent set of histories2
“maximally refined consistent with decoherence, with its individual histories ex-
hibiting as much as possible patterns of classical correlation in time.” [GMH90b,
1All of this is very much in line with Bohr’s ideas!
2This description is really rather obscure. Is every history supposed to behave classically? Surely
not. There will always be some histories where the laws of classical physics are grossly violated.
Are just the histories with high probability supposed to behave classically? This may work but
it implies the disturbing idea that there are other domains with classical variables with completely
non-classical behaviour.
A preferable approach is to look for the set of histories which best captures the type of classical
facts in which one is interested. Then the histories formalism may be used to prove that the histories
with classical dynamics have high probability. A sketch of such a proof has already been carried out
by Omne`s [Omn92, §16] using the mathematics of micro-local analysis.
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§VI]
Branching histories
The histories formalism may actually be inadequate for the present interpretation.
It may be necessary to use a slightly more general formalism in which the set of
projectors at a later time may depend on which projector materialised at an earlier
time. This would allow S to contain projectors referring, say, to the weather today
in Paris only in branches in which the Earth formed and Paris was built. (The
importance of this is that histories which describe the weather of non-existent cities
may not be consistent.)
Measurement
In this interpretation there is no fundamental measurement process. Of course, if
S contains a projector at time t1 indicating the existence of a bubble chamber and
projectors at time t2 indicating the existence of the same chamber with or without
a track then the formalism leads to appropriate probabilities for the chamber being
found with or without a track. A perfect illusion of measurement is created.
Determinism
The interpretation describes a non-deterministic universe.
Locality
The present interpretation sketches what one might call a universal theory. There
is no way per se to talk about some subset of the universe in isolation, over time.
Of course, individual projectors in S at a given time may relate to this part of the
universe or that.
Thus, although the term local has not really been defined for this type of theory, the
very formulation of the theory is in some sense contrary to locality.
As usual, the discussion can be made more concrete by considering the EPR situation.
Suppose some projector in S at time t1 stipulates that at location C there exists a
macroscopic apparatus S. Orthodox quantum mechanics might tell us that this S
will emit a particle of spin zero which will decay into two particles of spin half.
At time t2, some projectors in S may talk about detectors at two distant points, A
and B, centred at C and about whether each of these registers up or down. Suppose
CHAPTER III.8. DECOHERENT HISTORIES (ONTOLOGY) 86
orthodox quantum mechanics relates this to a measurement of spin.
The interpretation predicts that at time t2 the results on A and B will be anti-
correlated. Since there was nothing within the formalism (say at C) corresponding
to these values being predetermined, this correlation can only be seen as nonlocal.
Philosophy
The interpretation sketches a realistic ontology.
Criticism
The idea of having to select S in order to make everything work may seem disturbing.
Nevertheless, most physicists accept that Hˆ and ρˆ have to be chosen, not derived.
One can not therefore reject this interpretation simply because in introduces another
parameter.
Nevertheless, there is an important difference between the parameters. One can give
clear objective criteria for selecting Hˆ, namely that it should be such that, when
plugged into Schro¨dinger’s equation, it predicts all the correlations observed in the
lab. ρˆ should be such as to lead to the presently observed cosmology. The criteria for
selecting S are, for now, more vague and subjective. They have to do with capturing
the types of facts which humans perceive.
Variations
Approximate decoherence
It is sometimes assumed merely that the set S should be approximately consistent.
However, Dowker and Kent [DK94, §4] have shown that it is plausible that every
approximately consistent set is close, in some sense, to a consistent set. It is therefore
always possible to use a consistent set and only these should be given a fundamental
role in interpretation.
Universal state
Above, the idea of a quantum state has been dispensed with leaving only the histories.
The interpretation may be cast in a more familiar form by saying that the universe
has a state in H which evolves according to Schro¨dinger’s equation. Then, at each
time t appearing in S, say with projectors (Pˆ1(t), Pˆ2(t), . . . ), the state |ψ〉 collapses
into one of Pˆ1(t)|ψ〉, Pˆ2(t)|ψ〉,. . . with appropriate probabilities.
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This presentation is certainly more familiar3 especially in that it assigns a state to the
universe at all times, not just at the discrete times in S. However, this only serves to
obscure the point that everything one might want to say about the universe should,
in fact, be said using a projector in S.
Many-histories
In the many-histories interpretation it is assumed that there is one world as described
above for every possible set of histories S consistent with respect to Hˆ and ρˆ. (There
is no multiplicity of worlds corresponding to different histories in one set.) This is
supposed to solve the problem of selecting S.
However, this solution is inadequate. It does allows one to apply the anthropic prin-
ciple to explain why humans exist in a world with quasiclassical behaviour. But it
can give us no hope that the universe will still be quasiclassical tomorrow!
Many-worlds
Whether there is one or many sets of histories, the idea that one history from the set
is realised may be replaced by the idea that all the histories are realised in parallel
worlds. In fact, one may imagine one initial world splitting at each time in S giving
a perfectly rigorous version of the many-worlds interpretation (with or without the
extra multiplicity of many-histories).
Note however that this is not a faithful realisation of Everett’s idea because the total
state of the universe does not obey Schro¨dinger’s equation at the times in S.
As in the ordinary many-worlds interpretation, some might complain that it is difficult
to talk about the probability of future events in this version, although in fact this is
possible.
The choice of many worlds or one comes down to a choice between determinism and
economy.
Conclusion
This interpretation seems to work! The fact that it is very unfamiliar need not be a
problem. In addition to the existing search for Hˆ and ρˆ, the interpretation necessitates
a search for S. The interpretation will only be successful if some natural criteria for
selecting S emerge.
3It is telling, for example, that Omne`s [Omn88a, §2], [Omn90, §2] introduces a rule for the time
evolution of a state vector even though the notion of a state vector plays no role whatsoever in his
interpretation (although projectors do). The idea of the state vector is very entrenched.
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The idea of using consistent histories in the interpretation of quantum mechanics
was suggested by Griffiths [Gri84] although Griffiths did not explicitly suggest an
interpretation.
The work which most closely resembles the above presentation is that of Gell-Mann
and Hartle [Har91, GMH90a, GMH90b, GMH93, Har93d, Har93c, Har93b, Har93a,
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[Hal93b, Hal93c, Hal93a, Hal94].
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tension, clarification, and completion of the Everett interpretation” [GMH90b, §III]
and that consistent sets of histories “give a definite meaning to Everett’s ‘branches’ ”
[GMH90b, §IV.E]. This is presumably the first reference to the many-world version
mentioned above. However, Gell-Mann and Hartle do not take this literally. They
prefer the term ‘many histories’ to ‘many worlds’ suggesting a many-stories type of
many worlds but reject even that. Instead, there are many worlds only in the sense
that “quantum mechanics prefers none over the another except via probabilities”
[GMH90b, §XIII]. This seems to suggest the primary interpretation above. They
seem to prefer to think about the choice of branch being made at each time in S, not
in one go.
Gell-Mann and Hartle do talk about other sets of histories (which they call other
domains). However, they do not mean it in the sense of the many-histories inter-
pretation above since they envisage the possibility of communication between the
domains [GMH94, §IV]. This type of situation does not seem to fit in with any of
the ontological models proposed above. It may make sense in the context of the
epistemological models of the next chapter.
It must be emphasised that Gell-Mann and Hartle did not explicitly introduce any of
the interpretation in this chapter and it is doubtful that they are committed to any
of them. The important point is that inspiration for all these interpretations may be
found in their work.
The idea of many-histories is discussed in [DK94, §5.4]. They do not say who invented
it but do say that the idea was mentioned to them by Griffiths.
The idea of branch-dependent sets of histories is discussed in [GMH90b, §X].
The phenomenon of decoherence was briefly discussed in Chapter III.1, see references
there. The relevance of this to finding consistent histories is discussed in the work of
Gell-Mann and Hartle, see above.
A particularly insightful discussion on many of the technical and philosophical issues
surrounding histories interpretations may be found in [DK94].
Chapter III.9
Decoherent histories
(Epistemology)
Introduction
The present interpretation says: why not do away altogether with the quantum for-
malism and use the logic of consistent histories as a way of talking about the world!
This rather abstract idea turns out to work rather well. The ideas are mainly due
Griffiths and to Omne`s who calls the interpretation the logical interpretation.
Formulation
Rules
• Every quantum system may be associated with a separable Hilbert space H; an
initial state consisting of a density matrix ρˆ on H; and a Hamiltonian consisting of
a densely defined self-adjoint operator Hˆ on H
• any fact about any system may be associated with a projector on the associated H
in such a way that the following hold.
• The projectors associated with the same fact at different times are related by the
Heisenberg equation.
• One may reason about a system, in particular deriving the probabilities for un-
known past and future facts from known past facts, such reasoning always to be
carried out within a consistent set of histories.
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Discussion
This interpretation is purely epistemological. It accepts that we have knowledge of
the present and past and tells us what can be derived about the future and about
unknown aspects of the past.
In contrast to the interpretation of the previous chapter, the present interpretation
allows us immediately to reason about all systems using all types of facts, notably,
microscopic facts. As such, it directly formalises physical intuition on all scales.
The price to be paid is in the lack of an ontology. The interpretation does not tell
us how to describe the state of a system. It does not tell us how the potential facts
about which one may reason become actual facts. (In fact, Omne`s has gone so far as
to suggest that the latter question will never be answered1 [Omn91, §5].)
Details of reasoning
Such reasoning is carried out by writing down all known present and past facts. One
then finds the consistent histories containing all such facts.
At this point there are two approaches. One may look for facts which appear in all
such histories. Following [Omn91, §6] such facts will be called true facts and, following
[DK94, §5.2], those which have probability 1 in all the histories will be called definite
while those which have probability p in all the histories will be called probabilistic.
Alternatively, one may look for facts which appear in any one of the histories. Fol-
lowing the same authors these may be called definite or probabilistic reliable facts.
Although Omne`s [Omn91] attempted to base his interpretation on the derivation of
true facts, it turns out, not surprisingly, that true facts are rather hard to come by
[DK94, §5.2].
If one wants to be able to make predictions, one must rely on reliable facts. This is the
approach taken by Griffiths [Gri93]. This has some seemingly strange consequences
(see Locality and Criticism) but it all works in the end.
(Omne`s has apparently not yet set out his position on true and reliable facts in the
wake of the attack on the practicability of true facts in [DK94, §5.2].)
Comparison with ontological version and Copenhagen interpretation
Note that in the ontological interpretation of the previous chapter one is also free to
perform the type of reasoning suggested here. However, there such reasoning should
in the first instance be limited to the macroscopic facts one can directly perceive
1although he may have changed his mind [Omn94].
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and these are all included in the single consistent set of histories S. Therefore, all
fundamental reasoning is limited to this one set of histories. If one wanted to use
other reasoning, say about a microscopic system, one would have to prove that this
is valid.
Omne`s points out the similarities between his interpretation and Bohr’s, despite the
different formulations [Omn90, §29]. This is really a reflection of the fact that both
take an epistemological approach. The profound advantage of Omne`s’ interpretation
lies in the fact that, far from assuming classical physics, it actually implies classical
physics. In this sense it is manifestly internally consistent while the Copenhagen
interpretation is not.
Measurement
Using micro-local analysis, Omne`s has been able to outline a proof of all the mea-
surement axioms of quantum mechanics in terms of the simple rules above [Omn90,
§III].
Determinism
The theory is non-deterministic.
Locality
This question has caused some confusion. Omne`s states that in the EPR type of
situation, the measurement on one particle entails as a reliable fact the collapse of
the wave function of the other, a form of nonlocality. Omne`s takes comfort in that
this is not a true fact [Omn91, §7,8] (although it would now seem that almost nothing
is).
Griffiths, on the other hand, uses reliable facts but still argues that the interpretation
is local [Gri94a].
The confusion is due to the fact that the interpretation is purely epistemological (com-
pare with Bohr’s interpretation, Chapter III.2, where locality also causes confusion)
whereas locality is an ontological concept. One can say in the interpretation that
when the local particle is examined it allows the remote spin to be predicted. But
one cannot say whether this is cause and effect or whether a predetermined value is
being revealed.
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Philosophy
The interpretation is epistemological. It does not lead to an obvious ontological
theory. (In fact the only candidate so far proposed for such a theory is extremely
awkward involving an interaction between space-time and matter inducing a Brownian
motion which causes potential facts to become reality [Omn94].)
Criticism
Several criticisms of this interpretation are made by d’Espagnat [d’E89] although
none stand up to closer examination [Gri93].
The first criticism is that the future influences the past. Consider a particle which
has been prepared in stationary state (|u〉 + |v〉)/√2. Tomorrow the particle will be
measured either in the basis |u〉, |v〉 or in the basis (|u〉 ± |v〉). In the former case, it
is consistent to talk about whether its state now is |u〉 or |v〉 while in the latter case
it is not.
However, the future is not influencing the past. Suppose an experiment is performed
now measuring the state either (A) in the basis |u〉, |v〉 or (B) in the basis (|u〉 ±
|v〉)/√2. An experimenter performing a measurement tomorrow in the basis |u〉, |v〉
will be able to say “if (A) was performed yesterday then I am certain that the result
was such and such”. An experimenter performing an experiment tomorrow in the
basis (|u〉±|v〉)/√2 will be able to say no such thing. This is an indisputable property
of the world which is captured by the histories formalism. Is does not mean that the
future influences the past but merely that in the future one may choose which aspect
of the past to reconstruct.
The second criticism is that logic fails. In the same example, if tomorrow the experi-
menter measures the state in the basis |u〉, |v〉 and obtains a result of |u〉 the histories
formalism allows him or her to conclude that the state today was |u〉. Equally, a differ-
ent set of histories gives, from the very same facts, the conclusion that the state today
was (|u〉 + |v〉)/√2 (following from the initial state). Nevertheless, it is not possible
to conclude the nonsensical fact that the state today is |u〉 and (|u〉+ |v〉)/√2.
Again, it is reality which gives this result, not the histories formalism. In this sit-
uation, if someone had performed either experiment (A) or (B) the experimenter
tomorrow could with certainty say what the result was in either case. It does not
make sense to infer the conjunction of the two results because the two experiments
cannot be performed simultaneously. The situation is familiar from quantum logic
(§II.1.7).
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Variations
Choice of quasiclassical domain There may be more than one quasiclassical do-
main. If so, Gell-Mann and Hartle suggest that Information Gathering and Utilising
Systems (IGUSs) such as humans may be able to subjectively choose a quasiclassical
domain. Alternatively, these systems may evolve to exploit a particular quasiclassical
domain.
Both ideas seem strange. By what mechanism does the IGUS choose a domain? In
the alternative, what quasiclassical domain should be used to study evolution?
Conclusion
The interpretation provides an elegant epistemology. Ultimately, it would be prefer-
able to have an ontological theory, perhaps along the lines of the previous chapter.
Then, the present interpretation may be introduced simply as a convenient way for
discussing microscopic systems.
Bibliography
Histories were introduced by Griffiths [Gri84]. This paper suggested their use in
interpretation but was somewhat vague about what the new interpretation should be.
The application of these ideas to the EPR experiment is presented in [Gri87]. The
interpretational and logical aspects are further developed in [Gri93, Gri94b, Gri94a].
In a series of papers, Omne`s showed how decoherent histories may be analysed with
classical logic [Omn88a], how histories explain interference effects and the EPR exper-
iment [Omn88b] and how the classical world is recovered [Omn88c]. The semiclassical
world is then investigated in [Omn89]. These ideas are repeated in [Omn90, Omn92].
True and reliable facts are investigated in [Omn91].
Part IV
Conclusion
Nine interpretations have been described.
What does each imply for the cat?
Which are the most promising?
What does the future hold?
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Chapter IV.1
Conclusion
The nine lives
In its first life, Schro¨dinger’s cat may be viewed in two ways. Either it is part of a
quantum system and it exists in a superposition of being dead and alive until someone
checks. Here curiousity kills the cat. Or, perhaps the cat should be seen as an observer
and it causes the trigger into a definite state of fired or not. Thus, the cat kills itself.
The two predictions are contradictory but it is practically impossible to tell them
apart.
In its second life, there is no such thing as a cat. If one tries to analyse a cat with
accuracy of order h, a cat may only be defined as part of an integral phenomenon, eg.
in terms of milk being consumed and hairs being left around the place. The concepts
of dead and alive are not even defined until one tries to see whether any milk is
consumed!
In its third life the cat is in a superposition of dead and alive until a conscious being
checks up on it.
In its fourth life, the cat is either dead or alive. However, in any ensemble there will
always turn out to be some dead and some alive. It is impossible to predict which
will live and which will die.
In its fifth life, the cat causes the entire world to split into two. In one world it lives,
in the other it dies.
In its sixth life, the cat is in a linear superposition of being alive and dead. Half of
Schro¨dinger’s minds perceive it to be definitely alive while the other half perceive it
to be definitely dead. In a sense, all are wrong.
In its seventh life, the cat is either alive or dead, assuming that these concepts may
be defined purely in terms of the positions of the cat’s constituent particles. If so, the
cat’s fate actually follows deterministically from a full specification of the initial state.
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(Otherwise, it will be in a superposition of dead and alive until someone correlates
these with some position.)
In its eighth life, the cat will either live or die according to a random transition. The
microscopic trigger doesn’t exist except by virtue of its effect on the bomb and cat.
In its ninth life, one can predict that the cat will be alive or dead with equal probabil-
ities. If it is found to be dead or alive one may conclude that the bomb respectively
had triggered or had not. But one cannot talk about whether the cat is dead or alive.
Discussion
The orthodox interpretation works well in practice but is ambiguous and therefore
unacceptable. Bohr’s epistemological views are also somewhat vague and require
classical physics to be assumed.
For those who are satisfied with epistemology, the decoherent histories approach ad-
mirably ties down any ambiguity or vagueness. It may be used to recover classical
physics.
Those who would like to see an ontological model of the world must look elsewhere.
Neither many-world nor many-minds provide such models. The idea that the mind
causes collapse does but the model is problematic.
Bohm’s interpretation does seem to work although it is rather awkward, especially in
the context of quantum field theory.
The best hope at the moment for an ontological theory is that the world’s state col-
lapses according to some fixed set of consistent histories. However, no clear criterion
have emerged for the appropriate set of histories.
Finally, there are approaches which involve not interpretation of quantum mechanics
but modification. These approaches have not been considered here. The most suc-
cessful of these is the stochastic scheme of ‘GRW’ [Web86] (this scheme was put in a
very nice form by Bell [Bel87a]) although it is not without its problems (eg. [Alb92,
pp.92–111]). Several other attempts have involved introducing non-linear terms in
the Schro¨dinger equation but none of these seems to work.
Final world
Quantum mechanics is a theory lacking an ontological picture of the world. The
search for such an ontology has been long, hard and appallingly haphazard. It is time
that the entire programme was defined and analysed in a systematic and uniform
mathematical way. Strange as this idea may seem, I am convinced that it is possible.
When this programme is completed, theoretical physicists will finally be able to put
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the cat out and take a well earned rest.
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